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“THE ESSENCE OF A FREE SOCIETY”: THE
EXECUTIVE POWERS LEGACY OF JUSTICE
STEVENS AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS DEFERENCE
Dawn Johnsen
ABSTRACT—After 9/11, Justice John Paul Stevens insisted the United
States maintain its foundational commitment to the rule of law—the very
“essence of a free society.” Justice Stevens led the Court’s scrutiny and
rejection of early Bush Administration policies regarding the detention and
prosecution of suspected terrorists. Since it lost Justice Stevens’s passionate
and principled voice in 2008, the Court has not addressed the scope of the
President’s military detention authority. This Article considers Justice
Stevens’s role in the Court’s altered stance, and also a complementary
explanation: the Obama Administration’s improved interpretation and
exercise of executive authority. Informed and inspired by Justice Stevens’s
jurisprudence, a post-9/11 academic debate explores the deference due the
Executive’s statutory and treaty interpretations on foreign affairs matters,
appropriately favoring an intermediate measure of foreign affairs deference
that provides a meaningful judicial check while respecting the Executive’s
constitutional authority and expertise. This Article highlights the Bush
Administration’s extraordinarily flawed theory and often secret claims of
authority to contravene federal statutes that effectively forfeited its claim to
judicial deference. Prevailing narratives that emphasize continuity—
between the Bush and Obama policies as well as presidential power
aggrandizements—underappreciate the unusual, arguably unique, nature of
the Bush approach’s threat to the rule of law. Future judicial review of
foreign affairs matters might not be as robust as some hope and others fear.
Only the combination of judicial review and continued vigilance from
nonjudicial sources can effectively check the Executive during times of war
and crisis. The Article concludes by briefly assessing President Obama’s
performance on rule-of-law issues that might never face judicial review.
AUTHOR—Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer
School of Law. For their thoughtful suggestions and generosity with their
time and ideas, I am deeply grateful to David Barron, Robert Chesney,
Daniel Conkle, Martin Lederman, Deborah Pearlstein, Ryan Scott, Stephen
Vladeck, the Cornell Law School faculty workshop series participants, and
my exceptional research assistant, Eric Spengler.
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INTRODUCTION
During his extraordinary career on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
John Paul Stevens distinguished himself on a wide range of vital issues
affecting the nation. His opinions on issues of executive power may be his
most enduring legacy. His very first majority opinion, the relatively
unknown Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,1 reviewed the power of an Executive
Branch agency to limit certain federal jobs to U.S. citizens. Justice Stevens
also wrote for the majority in several landmark executive power cases.
Clinton v. Jones2 allowed a civil lawsuit to proceed against a sitting
president for conduct alleged to have occurred before he took office.
Clinton v. City of New York3 invalidated a federal statute that afforded the
President what Congress termed a “line-item veto.” One of the most cited
Supreme Court opinions of all time,4 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,5
articulated standards to govern judicial review of Executive Branch
statutory interpretations. For a quarter-century after Chevron, as the Court
wrestled with its application, Justice Stevens authored influential opinions
on issues that clarified Chevron’s reach and closely divided the Court.6
And then came September 11th. Justice Stevens led the Court in
checking executive excesses in counterterrorism efforts following the
September 11, 2001 attacks. At a time when the President strongly resisted
1

426 U.S. 88 (1976).
520 U.S. 681 (1997).
3
524 U.S. 417 (1998).
4
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2580 (2006) (noting that Chevron has become the “most cited case in modern
public law”).
5
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6
See infra notes 157–65 and accompanying text.
2
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checks on terrorism policies from Congress and the courts—claiming broad
constitutional authority to ignore such limits—the Supreme Court insisted
otherwise. Justice Stevens’s post-9/11 opinions will stand as powerful,
historic examples of the United States’ commitment to the rule of law and
the judiciary’s role in safeguarding it.
That the Court would provide a meaningful check on unlawful
terrorism policies was not preordained. In the months following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, conventional wisdom, supported by precedent, predicted
that the Court would afford strong deference to President George W. Bush’s
choices.7 Foreign affairs, national security, war powers—these all top the
list of areas in which the judiciary historically has practiced the greatest
restraint and deference in reviewing executive action, albeit inspiring fierce
debate and occasionally leading to spectacularly bad results.8
Justice Stevens, more than any other Justice, is rightfully credited with
building the majorities behind the Court’s willingness to scrutinize and
reject early Bush Administration policies regarding the detention and
prosecution of those suspected of terrorism—particularly those detained,
interrogated, and prosecuted outside of the United States’ civilian system
and geographic boundaries in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In Rasul v. Bush,9
Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, which held that the federal habeas
corpus statute encompassed the Guantánamo detainees, permitting them to
7

See, e.g., William Glaberson, Government Has Power to Curb Some Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2001, at B7 (“[L]egal experts say the courts have effectively ceded to the government vast powers to
limit many freedoms when the nation’s security was threatened in the past. . . . [M]any of the new limits
may never receive rigorous court review.”). Of course, from the outset, critics argued vehemently
against the legality and for judicial review of the early, contested Bush policies. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal
& Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259,
1277 (2002) (arguing congressional authorization was required for President Bush’s military
commissions).
8
The Court’s now-infamous decisions upholding discrimination against Japanese Americans during
World War II out of deference to the Executive’s national security judgments stand in sharp contrast to
the Court’s post-9/11 rulings and as reminders of the danger of excessive judicial deference. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding an “exclusion order” forcing Japanese
Americans living in designated military zones to move from their homes to detention camps);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (unanimously upholding a curfew imposed on
Japanese Americans in designated military areas). Justice Stevens served as a law clerk in 1947 to
Justice Wiley Rutledge, who experienced “anguish” over his role in those cases. Craig Green, Wiley
Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99, 139 n.174
(2006) (citing JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF
JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 245 (2004)). Several commentators have described the extraordinary
influences that clerkship experience apparently had on Justice Stevens’s post-9/11 opinions. See, e.g.,
Green, supra, at 114–15 (discussing, among other opinions, the role of Justice Rutledge’s dissent in In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)); Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who
Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens’s Influence from World War II to the War on Terror, 92 VA. L.
REV. 501, 507–13 (2006) (discussing the influence of Justice Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens v. Clark, 335
U.S. 188, 193 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), on which Justice Stevens worked as Justice Rutledge’s
law clerk).
9
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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challenge the legality of their detention in federal court. The Court’s finding
that the rule of law—at least the law of habeas—governed these military
detentions thwarted the Bush Administration’s efforts to create a detention
center beyond the reach of the federal courts and the protections of U.S.
law. In Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,10 the
Court declared unlawful the Bush Administration’s system of military
commissions. The Court’s reasoning also made evident the illegality of the
Administration’s use of torture and other extreme interrogation policies. In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 the Court held that the government could not
preventively detain U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants” without providing
certain due process protections, including the right to challenge the
detention and to have the advice of counsel. Justice Stevens would have
gone further in protecting liberty and joined a dissent by Justice Antonin
Scalia that found this uncharged, preventive detention of a U.S. citizen
unlawful absent a congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.12
Justice Stevens insisted on maintaining the United States’ foundational
commitment to being a nation ruled by law—a government of laws and not
of men. His vigorous dissent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla objected to the Court’s
dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds and declared that Jose
Padilla’s lengthy detention without charge threatened the very “essence of a
free society”: “Even more important than the method of selecting the
people’s rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints
imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”13 Among his colleagues,
Justice Stevens maintained an extraordinary faith in the ability of the
courts—of judges—to exercise the principled judgment necessary to uphold
the rule of law and to check the political branches when they stray.
After deciding five military detention cases in five years, the Supreme
Court has not since 2008 decided the merits of another case that involves
the rights of Guantánamo detainees or otherwise defines the scope of the
President’s military detention authority.14 This lack of Court activity was
10

548 U.S. 557 (2006).
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
12
See id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13
542 U.S. 426, 455, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14
The Court held in 2008 that Congress had acted in violation of the Constitution’s Suspension
Clause by depriving Guantánamo detainees of habeas review without providing an adequate alternative.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The Court granted certiorari in two detainee cases after
Boumediene, but did not address the scope of military detention authority in either. In al-Marri v.
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.), the Court granted certiorari to vacate as moot the Fourth
Circuit’s en banc decision upholding the military detention of a noncitizen arrested within the United
States after the government transferred the detainee to civilian custody for prosecution by criminal
indictment. And in Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam), the Court originally granted
certiorari to answer the question “whether a federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction has the power to
order the release of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay ‘where the Executive detention is indefinite and
without authorization in law, and release into the continental United States is the only possible effective
remedy.’” Id. at 1235 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (No. 0811
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particularly remarkable during the year following Justice Stevens’s 2010
retirement, when the Court denied certiorari in six Guantánamo cases from
the D.C. Circuit.15 Also striking is the D.C. Circuit’s treatment of detainees
in these and other cases: not a single detainee has won a clear victory before
the D.C. Circuit and not one has attained a ruling for his release.16 Critics
have attacked the court’s reasoning in some of these cases (and even more,
the reasoning in some of the separate concurrences and dissents) as not
faithful to the Supreme Court’s detainee rulings.17
In her June 2011 end-of-Term “Scorecard,” longtime New York Times
Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse described the Court’s “voice on
Guantánamo” as “missing in action”;18 elsewhere she concluded that the
Court might be “finally finished with Guantánamo,”19 possibly due to

1234), 2009 WL 934097). The Court ultimately declined to reach the merits, however, because by the
time the case reached the Court “each of the detainees . . . ha[d] received at least one offer of
resettlement in another country,” and the Court found that this “change in the underlying facts” mooted
the question presented. Id. The Supreme Court therefore vacated and remanded to the D.C. Circuit, id.,
which effectively reinstated its original ruling—a decision that some legal scholars have criticized as not
faithful to the Supreme Court’s due process analysis in Boumediene. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C.
Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1477–78 (2011) (“Kiyemba I reached its due
process holding by effectively ignoring Boumediene . . . .”). When a second petition for certiorari in the
case reached the Court, Justice Elena Kagan recused herself and the Court denied certiorari. See
Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011). Four of the Justices—Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor—filed an opinion respecting the denial of certiorari that
gives rise to the question of whether the Court would have granted certiorari the second time had Justice
Stevens not retired.
15
See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Al
Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011); Awad v.
Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d
1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011); Ameziane v. Obama, 620 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 1673 (2011); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
16
See, e.g., Peter Finn & Del Quentin Wilber, On Appeals, Detainees Have Never Won, WASH.
POST, July 6, 2011, at A1. Notably, in four of the five cases in which the Court reached the merits and
rejected the Bush Administration’s policies, the Court reversed the courts of appeals, which were more
inclined toward the Executive. See infra Part II.
17
The New York Times, for example, editorialized against the D.C. Circuit’s handling of detainees’
claims and in favor of Supreme Court review in 2011: “The appellate court has all but nullified that view
of judicial power and responsibility backed by Justice Kennedy and the court majority [in Boumediene].
The Supreme Court should remind the appellate court which one leads the federal judicial system and
which has a solemn duty to follow.” Editorial, A Right Without a Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at
A26. In the year following, the D.C. Circuit’s criticism, and arguable defiance, has intensified. See infra
note 23 and Part III.C. For a thoughtful and thorough review of the D.C. Circuit’s post-Boumediene
decisions, see Vladeck, supra note 14.
18
Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court Scorecard, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 13, 2011, 9:30
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/a-supreme-court-scorecard.
19
Linda Greenhouse, Gitmo Fatigue at the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Apr. 6,
2011, 8:45 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/gitmo-fatigue-at-the-supreme-court.
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“Gitmo [f]atigue.”20 Among other theories, veteran Court observer Lyle
Denniston suggested that “the Court no longer has as strong a champion of
detainees’ legal claims now that Justice John Paul Stevens has retired.”21
Undoubtedly, Justice Stevens championed detainees’ rights and the
rule of law while on the Court, and the loss of his passionate and principled
voice inevitably altered internal Court dynamics on detainee issues. This
Article will review his vital role and also consider another, complementary
explanation for the Court’s altered stance: in light of changes in the
government’s detainee policies since President Barack Obama took office,
the Court may have perceived less of a need to provide a check on
executive power and therefore reverted to a stance more typical of judicial
review on matters of foreign affairs. This explanation runs counter to a
prevailing narrative, from the ideological right and left, that emphasizes
continuity between the Bush and Obama Administrations’ counterterrorism
policies, as well as general presidential aggrandizement of power.
Notwithstanding understandable disappointment from some quarters with
the degree of change, executive policy in fact has changed markedly under
President Obama, particularly when evaluated in respects relevant to
judicial review and executive legal compliance. The various influences
behind the Supreme Court’s decisions not to review the merits of additional
detainee cases since 2008 almost certainly include substantial
improvements in the Executive’s interpretation and exercise of its legal
authorities—changes prompted in part by the Court’s earlier detainee
decisions.22 If the Court decides to reengage, the reason might stem less
from any perceived ongoing executive abuse and more from the D.C.
Circuit’s sharp criticism of the Supreme Court’s rulings recognizing
detainees’ rights.23
20

Id. After noting that the Court’s decisions all “required the expenditure of substantial amounts of
institutional capital,” Greenhouse concluded: “My sense is that the well, at least for now, has run dry.
The court was there when we needed it, for which, as a citizen, I am grateful. If it now has nothing
constructive to say, it has earned its rest.” Id.
21
Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit in Control on Detainees, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2011, 9:36 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/04/dc-circuit-in-control-on-detainees.
22
Citation of detainees’ zero-win record in the D.C. Circuit without more may be misleading. It
does not account for either detainee victories in the district court that the government did not appeal, or
government decisions to release and transfer detainees voluntarily. For a summary of the status of the
Guantánamo habeas cases and a discussion of the complications of compiling a win–loss record, see
Benjamin Wittes, Robert M. Chesney & Larkin Reynolds, The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0: The
Guantánamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 7–11 (Apr. 2011), http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/05_guantanamo_wittes/05_guantanamo_wittes.pdf. This
valuable report, for example, cites seventeen cases in which detention was deemed or conceded unlawful
and fourteen cases in which detainees prevailed where either the government did not appeal or the initial
appeal was later dismissed. Id. at 10.
23
Shortly before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in seven
Guantánamo cases, including one in which a panel of the D.C. Circuit, in the course of holding against a
detainee, had criticized the Supreme Court in exceptionally harsh and provocative terms:
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Part I of this Article examines the Court’s rulings, and the Bush
Administration’s arguments to the Court, in each of the 9/11 detainee cases.
One useful lens for evaluation focuses on the appropriate role of the courts
vis-à-vis the Executive on matters of “foreign affairs”—a phrase this Article
uses to encompass war powers and national security. The review therefore
highlights the Administration’s arguments for judicial restraint and
deference, which the Court overwhelmingly rejected. Immediately apparent
are vital roles played by two Justices: Justice Stevens, as the chief
proponent of vigorous judicial review, and Justice Anthony Kennedy, the
more hesitant Justice in the middle of the Court, who ultimately cast the
deciding vote to play that strong judicial role.
In striking down various counterterrorism policies, the Court rejected
the Bush Administration’s legal interpretations of statutes and treaties and,
less directly, its interpretations of its own constitutional war powers. This
ignited a vibrant debate among legal academics and other commentators
over the degree of deference due the Executive’s legal interpretations on
foreign affairs matters, which is the subject of Part II. Justice Stevens’s
refusal to defer to the Executive’s views in the detainee cases features
prominently, as does his approach to deference on domestic issues in
Chevron and its progeny. Informed and inspired by Justice Stevens’s
jurisprudence, the post-9/11 literature makes great strides toward
developing an appropriately balanced approach to foreign affairs
deference—one that checks executive abuses while respecting the
Executive’s constitutional authorities and expertise on foreign affairs
matters.
Part III seeks to supplement the otherwise-rich deference debate by
highlighting one relatively unexamined aspect: the extraordinarily flawed
nature of the theory of executive authority and other legal interpretations
that informed the Bush Administration’s early counterterrorism policies.
The reasons for the Court’s aggressive review undoubtedly are multiple and
include a recognition of the judiciary’s special role in protecting individual
liberty—as painfully underscored by Korematsu’s lesson in the risks of

As the dissenters warned and as the amount of ink spilled in this single case attests, Boumediene’s
airy suppositions have caused great difficulty for the Executive and the courts. Luckily, this is a
shrinking category of cases. The ranks of Guantanamo detainees will not be replenished.
Boumediene fundamentally altered the calculus of war, guaranteeing that the benefit of
intelligence that might be gained—even from high-value detainees—is outweighed by the
systemic cost of defending detention decisions. While the court in Boumediene expressed
sensitivity to such concerns, it did not find them “dispositive.” Boumediene’s logic is compelling:
take no prisoners. Point taken.
Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted), reissued, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3510, 80 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1027). The
New York Times editorialized against the Court’s denials of certiorari: “[I]t is devastatingly clear that the
Roberts court has no interest in ensuring meaningful habeas review for foreign prisoners.” Editorial, The
Court Retreats on Habeas, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A34.
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excessive judicial deference to the Executive.24 Beyond the protection of
detainees’ rights, one likely principal influence behind the Court’s refusal to
defer was what the Court knew to be the extreme and deficient nature of
some of the Bush Administration’s secret legal interpretations: most
notorious, that waterboarding was not torture and thus not a crime under the
federal criminal anti-torture statute—and that, in any event, the President
could disregard federal laws that he believed constrained his war powers.
The popular understanding of the Bush Administration’s
counterterrorism policies underappreciates the unusual, arguably unique,
nature of the threat they posed to the rule of law and constitutional
structure. Other presidents have taken legally dubious actions based on
excessive views of their substantive war powers. Wartime Presidents
Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt come to mind; indeed, some of
President Bush’s advocates have compared him favorably to Presidents
Lincoln and Roosevelt. Their actions, however, are fundamentally
distinguishable: Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt acted openly, engaged in
public debate about the legality of their actions, and, most critically,
acknowledged Congress’s ultimate authority to resolve the particular
matters in dispute. President Bush relied on deeply flawed and often secret
legal interpretations to make erroneous claims of preclusive constitutional
war powers—that is, authority to act in direct violation of statutes enacted
by Congress or similar laws Congress might enact in the future.25 In the two
most significant examples, detainee interrogations and domestic
surveillance, the Bush Administration acted in secret for more than a year
(until the programs leaked), in effect depriving Congress of the ability even
to consider executive oversight or amendment of the relevant statute.
President Bush and others in his Administration bore awesome
responsibilities and undoubtedly were motivated by the desire to protect the
nation from terrorism. Their choice of methods, however, at times reflected
an explicit ideological preference to act unilaterally in order to expand
presidential war powers relative to Congress, and create a more powerful
presidency for future Administrations. Part III reviews what was publicly
known when the Court issued its 9/11 detainee rulings about the Bush
Administration’s deviations from longstanding executive practices, and
posits that—through failures of legal interpretation and execution of a
constitutional dimension—the Bush Administration effectively forfeited its
claim to judicial deference.
24

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also supra note 8.
See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008)
[hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem]; David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History] (providing a
remarkable survey of presidents’ claims of preclusive war powers, from George Washington to George
W. Bush, and establishing the exceptional nature of George W. Bush’s claims).
25
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Judicial review, although vital, cannot singlehandedly ensure the
legality of executive action. Essential nonjudicial constraints may be
undermined by overconfidence in the Court’s willingness to scrutinize
executive action and an overly cynical view of presidents’ willingness to
violate legal constraints on war powers. A proper appreciation of the
atypical nature of the Bush Administration’s claims of preclusive authority
suggests that future judicial review of foreign affairs matters might not be
as robust as some hope and others fear. Only the combined effects of
judicial review and continued vigilance from nonjudicial sources—
Congress, the press, the American public, the international community, and
even sources within the Executive Branch—can effectively keep the
Executive in check during times of war and national crisis. In that spirit,
Part III concludes by moving beyond the courts and foreign affairs
deference to a brief assessment of President Obama’s performance on ruleof-law issues that might never be the subject of plenary judicial review.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S 9/11 DETAINEE CASES
In adjudicating challenges to detainee policies, the federal courts
repeatedly confront a difficult question that is as old as the Constitution:
What role should the judiciary play in reviewing executive action in the
realm of foreign affairs? Faced with challenges to its claims of power to
detain, interrogate, and try before military tribunals those it suspected of
terrorism, the Bush Administration invoked the full range of available
doctrines and practices the Court long has relied upon to constrain judicial
review: political question, mootness, ripeness, and abstention doctrines;
state secrets and other privileges; discretionary Supreme Court review; and
deferential standards of review for the Executive’s legal interpretations,
factual determinations, and actions. Although distinct in many respects,
these various doctrines reflect similar considerations regarding
constitutional structure and the three branches’ authorities and relative
competencies—considerations that often lead courts to afford the Executive
some measure of deference. One common approach across the doctrines
and practices weighs judicial protection of individual liberties and the rule
of law against respect for the Executive’s superior political accountability
and functional abilities on matters of foreign affairs.26
In the decades before September 11, 2001, the Supreme Court
emphasized that on foreign affairs matters the balance specially tips against
vigorous judicial review.27 The Court sometimes described the deference
due the Executive in very strong or even absolute terms, along the lines of
often quoted dicta from the 1936 case United States v. Curtiss-Wright
26

See infra Part II.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 663
(2000) (“At least when added together, the various categories of deference amount to a very deferential
approach by United States courts in the foreign affairs area.”).
27
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Export Corp., describing “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations.”28 Writing just a year before 9/11, Professor Curtis
Bradley usefully characterized the state of debate on judicial deference due
the Executive on issues of foreign affairs.29 Bradley described the works of
academics who aligned themselves at the other end of the deference
spectrum, far from Curtiss-Wright, where they opposed the prevailing
notions of foreign affairs deference, including on the ground that it
subverted the rule of law by largely immunizing foreign affairs from
judicial review.30 Prominent among critics at that time, Professor Harold
Koh noted that the “lavish description” of executive authority in CurtissWright led to its excessive citation by government attorneys, who knew it as
the “Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right” cite.31
Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that the Bush
Administration generally took a strong Curtiss-Wright-like approach in
defending its detainee policies, resisting judicial review and arguing for
strong deference. In each of the Court’s five detainee cases, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) first urged the Court not to reach the merits of the
detainees’ claims and then argued in the alternative that, to defeat those
claims, the Court should defer to the Executive’s views of its constitutional
authorities and its interpretation and application of statutory and
international law. DOJ went even further and defied practice, especially in
its early years, by typically centering its defense of Administration policies
on a sweeping view of the President’s constitutional authorities, and only
secondarily addressing relevant statutes that conferred broad executive
powers.32
Also surprising was the Supreme Court’s response, in particular its
rejection of the Bush Administration’s claims with little deference or
restraint—or even express consideration of whether deference was due the
Executive.33 To the extent the Court recognized executive power, it looked
28

299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
Bradley described five categories of deference: political question deference, executive branch
lawmaking deference, international facts deference, persuasiveness deference, and Chevron deference.
Regarding this last category, Bradley noted that courts generally did not use the label “Chevron
deference” for foreign affairs and the principal focus of his article was to encourage its more deliberate
application. Bradley, supra note 27, at 659–63.
30
See id. at 650–51, 665–67.
31
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990).
32
Far more than in its briefs, the legal analysis in opinions of the Bush Administration’s Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), particularly in the Administration’s first few years, emphasized the President’s
unilateral and preclusive war powers to initiate war and subject suspected terrorists to military detention
and trial, warrantless surveillance, and extreme interrogations (even to the point of torture),
unconstrained by applicable federal statutes. See infra Part III.A.
33
Justice Stevens dissented from the one ruling in favor of the DOJ’s request to dismiss the case on
jurisdictional grounds. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29
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to statutory sources and avoided grounding authority in the President’s
constitutional war powers, thereby rejecting the Administration’s preferred
analysis. The Court looked especially to the September 18, 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and its meaning in light of
other acts of Congress.34 A brief review of each of the Court’s five cases,
with a focus on the Bush Administration’s arguments for deference and
against judicial review, also reveals special roles played by two Justices:
Justice Stevens’s leadership driving the Court’s willingness to take a hard
look and invalidate the challenged policies, and Justice Kennedy’s critical
and familiar role as the Justice in the middle of the Court.
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
The Court issued opinions in the first three cases on a single day: June
28, 2004. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,35 the Court rejected the Bush
Administration’s claims of constitutional and statutory authority to detain a
U.S. citizen indefinitely as an “enemy combatant” without affording him
access to counsel or an opportunity to challenge his detention.36 Six Justices
wrote opinions, and none commanded a majority; shifting majorities
resolved various issues. Most central, five Justices agreed that the AUMF
conferred some military detention authority,37 but eight Justices (all but
Justice Clarence Thomas) found that the Bush Administration’s policy of
unilateral, unreviewable detention without counsel violated constitutional or
statutory protections.38
The Bush Administration’s DOJ urged the Court to follow the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in “[a]pplying an appropriately deferential
standard of review”39 that reflected “[r]espect for separation of powers and
the limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military

34

With the AUMF, Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
35
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
36
Id. at 527, 533 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
37
Id. at 516–17; id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38
See id. at 532–34, 535–39 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39
Brief for the Respondents at 10, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020, at *10.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court because, as the plurality described, it found that
“separation of powers principles prohibited a federal court from ‘delv[ing] further into Hamdi’s status
and capture.’” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 515 (alteration in original) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d
450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003)); see also id. at 514–15 (“Article III contains nothing analogous to the specific
powers of war so carefully enumerated in Articles I and II.” (quoting Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 463) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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decisionmaking in connection with ongoing conflict.”40 As it generally
would in future detainee cases before the Court, DOJ cited for support, first,
the President’s constitutional war powers and precedent calling for strong
deference to the Executive Branch in light of those authorities,41 and
second, authority under the AUMF and other statutes, which it argued must
be interpreted in light of the President’s broad constitutional authorities.42 It
argued for deference also to the Executive’s interpretation of international
law.43 Finally, on an issue developed further in Rumsfeld v. Padilla,44 DOJ
defended the policy of denying counsel to detainees until “the military has
determined that such access would not interfere with ongoing intelligencegathering,” but argued that the Court need not reach that issue because the
military by that time had afforded Hamdi counsel.45 Only Justice Thomas,
citing the President’s Article II powers and superior expertise, endorsed the
call for absolute deference to the President’s determination that the
petitioner was subject to military detention.46
In the controlling plurality opinion (which Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer joined),
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor found the detention violated the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.47 Relying on the international law
of war to interpret the AUMF, the plurality found the AUMF gave the
government limited military detention authority, so the Court did not reach

40

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the Respondents, supra note 39,
at 26) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41
See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents, supra note 39, at 13–18, 25–27; see also id. at 25 (“As this
Court has observed, ‘courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the
Executive in military and national security affairs.’” (quoting Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
530 (1988)); id. (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper
subjects for judicial intervention.” (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); id. at 34 (warning against “second-guessing in a federal courtroom far removed from
the battlefield”).
42
Id. at 19–22; see also id. at 22 (“The canon of constitutional avoidance counsels against
interpreting Section 4001(a) [of the Non-Detention Act] in a manner that would interfere with the wellestablished authority of the Commander in Chief to detain enemy combatants in wartime.”).
43
Id. at 24 n.9 (“The determination whether captured enemy combatants are entitled to POW
[prisoner of war] privileges under the GPW [Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War] is a quintessential
matter that the Constitution (not to mention the GPW) leaves to the political branches and, in particular,
the President.”).
44
542 U.S. 426 (2004) (plurality opinion).
45
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 39, at 43–45.
46
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 588 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he President’s action
here is ‘supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.’”
(quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981))); see Brief for the Respondents, supra
note 39, at 25 (calling for the “utmost deference” to the President).
47
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532–33 (plurality opinion).
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the President’s claim of constitutional authority.48 Although the process due
could reflect military exigencies, the government had afforded Hamdi no
process at all, and the plurality found that some process was constitutionally
required (including access to counsel).49 Precedent supported not only the
general respect owed the President on military matters,50 but also the
competing commitment to individual liberty and the reality that during
times of crisis and emergency the Executive Branch faces its “greatest
temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees.”51 The
plurality flatly rejected DOJ’s argument that separation of powers principles
required extreme deference; instead, it declared that the Constitution
“envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake” and—most memorably—that “a state of war is not a blank check for
the President.”52
Justice Stevens joined a dissent by Justice Scalia that would have
rejected the Bush Administration’s claims even more completely on a
ground that left no room for deference.53 They instead would have held
Hamdi’s detention unconstitutional on the ground that Congress had not
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, which they found a necessary
prerequisite to the Executive’s ability to hold an American indefinitely
without charge: “The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon
system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment
at the will of the Executive.”54 Justice Scalia’s dissent emphasized its very
limited scope, noting only two detainees at that time were U.S. citizens
detained in the United States.55 This unusual pairing of Justices was not
repeated in any other detainee case; in the remaining four, including the
other two issued that very day, Justices Stevens and Scalia fell on opposite
sides.

48

Id. at 516–17. The plurality also found the AUMF satisfied the requirement of section 4001(a) of
the Non-Detention Act, which prohibited detention of a U.S. citizen “except pursuant to an Act of
Congress.” Id. at 517 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
49
Id. at 533–35, 539.
50
Id. at 531 (noting that Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988), recognized
“the reluctance of the courts ‘to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national
security affairs’”).
51
Id. at 532 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963)); see also id. at 530
(“[H]istory and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to
become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat.”).
52
Id. at 536.
53
Id. at 577–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, would have
found Hamdi’s detention forbidden by § 4001(a) of the Non-Detention Act, but largely agreed with the
plurality on the due process question, concerning the process that would be due if the detention were
authorized. Id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
54
Id. at 554–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55
Id. at 577.
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B. Rasul v. Bush
In Rasul v. Bush, Justice Stevens wrote for five Justices, and Justice
Scalia dissented for three.57 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.58
Hamdi was a U.S. citizen held in Virginia, but Rasul and his fellow
petitioners were noncitizens held at Guantánamo Bay—brought there, in
fact, for the purpose of preventing their access to federal courts.59
DOJ argued, and Justice Scalia in dissent agreed, that the federal courts
lacked jurisdiction over habeas claims by Guantánamo detainees.60 It
bolstered this interpretation of the federal habeas statute with references to
the grave constitutional concerns and military harm that would arise if the
Court were to allow the detainees access to judicial protection.61 DOJ’s brief
filed in Rumsfeld v. Padilla suggested that such harm included interference
with the interrogation of detainees, which would follow from access to
courts and lawyers.62 Although DOJ argued that Congress was better
situated than the Court to consider the issue,63 it also suggested that
Congress might be constitutionally barred from extending habeas
jurisdiction to Guantánamo detainees.64 DOJ also asserted that the President
had “conclusively determined” that Guantánamo detainees were not entitled
to prisoner-of-war (POW) status under the Geneva Conventions.65 In the
alternative, it suggested that the Court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine66 and sought to reassure
the Court that its review was unnecessary: the Executive Branch voluntarily
provided protections, and “diplomatic and political scrutiny” provided
external checks.67 Counsel for Rasul agreed that some judicial deference to
the Executive was appropriate, but noted that the Administration sought not
56

56

542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Id. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58
Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
59
Id. at 470–71 (majority opinion); see Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel,
Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29, 29 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
60
Brief for the Respondents at 10–11, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL
425739, at *10–11.
61
See id. at 41–43; id. at 42 (arguing that if the Court were to exercise jurisdiction it would
“directly interfere with the Executive’s conduct of the military campaign against al Qaeda and its
supporters”).
62
Brief for the Petitioner at 29, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL
542777, at *29.
63
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 60, at 45–46.
64
Id. at 45 (“To be sure, the Constitution would limit the ability of Congress to extend federal court
jurisdiction into areas that interfered with the core executive responsibilities.”).
65
Id. at 36.
66
Id. at 37 & n.19.
67
Id. at 47–50.
57
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merely deference but absolute and exclusive executive control over the
detainees.68
Justice Stevens’s dense and technical majority opinion in Rasul lacked
the kind of discussion found in Hamdi’s various opinions of the Judiciary’s
role in safeguarding liberty and how best to weigh competing constitutional
values. Focusing instead on dissecting complicated Court precedent—about
which he had particular knowledge from his time as Justice Wiley
Rutledge’s law clerk69—Justice Stevens held that the habeas statute
afforded federal courts jurisdiction over the detainees in part because of the
United States’ exclusive jurisdiction and control over the U.S. military base
at Guantánamo Bay.70 The Court implicitly rejected, but did not expressly
address, DOJ’s argument that the Court should accept the Department’s
interpretation in order to avoid “directly interfer[ing] with the Executive’s
conduct of the military campaign against al Qaeda and its supporters.”71 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy expressed greater concern than the
majority with the deference due the Executive, but agreed that on balance—
and in light of Guantánamo’s special status—the competing values of
respect for the President’s military authority and the Court’s role in
protecting against unlawful detention weighed in favor of habeas review.72
C. Rumsfeld v. Padilla
The Bush Administration’s only victory among the Court’s five
detainee cases came in convincing the Court not to reach the merits in
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,73 the third ruling issued on June 28, 2004. The
government had seized Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, in Chicago on suspicion
of conspiring to detonate a dirty bomb. After holding him for a month in
New York, where he was allowed access to counsel, President Bush
declared Padilla an “enemy combatant” and transferred him to military
custody—specifically, a military brig in South Carolina where he was held
for three and a half years, during most of which he was held in solitary

68

Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL
96764, at *11 (“The courts should certainly pay considerable deference to the executive in times of
crisis, and they have the wisdom and the experience to do so. But the government here is not asking for
deference. It contends that the courts do not even have the authority to defer; that they lack
jurisdiction . . . . The courts’ role may be limited in times of crisis, but they must have a role to play.”).
69
See Thai, supra note 8 (describing the import of a dissent issued by Justice Rutledge while Justice
Stevens served as his law clerk).
70
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 580–84.
71
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 60, at 42. The Court also signaled its view that the
detainees would prevail on the merits of their claims if their allegations were true. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at
483 n.15.
72
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73
542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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confinement, interrogated, and denied access to counsel.74 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the five-Justice majority (including Justice
Kennedy), agreed with DOJ that Padilla erred by filing his habeas petition
in the Southern District of New York rather than the District of South
Carolina, and dismissed the suit.75
In its alternative argument on the merits, which the Court did not
address, DOJ again relied on the President’s detention authority that flowed
from his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and his statutory
authority under the AUMF.76 It argued that the Court could review the
President’s judgments “only in exceptionally narrow situations, if at all”77
and emphasized that the President’s judgments resulted from “a careful,
thorough, and deliberative process consisting of several layers of review.”78
Counsel for the detainees responded that any argument for deference due
the Executive with regard to “enemy combatants” detained on the
battlefield was absent because Padilla was arrested in the United States.79
Relevant to Hamdi and Rasul, as well as Padilla, the Administration
expounded upon why it believed its policy of military detention without
access to counsel was essential to effective military operations and national
security. It defended military detention not only for the traditional purpose
of preventing a return to the battlefield, which the Court recognized as
legitimate in Hamdi,80 but also for the far more controversial purpose of
facilitating interrogation by creating a sense of hopelessness and
dependency on the interrogators. To explain its perceived need to deny
counsel to Padilla, the government submitted a sworn declaration of Vice
Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
which stated:
Only after such time as Padilla has perceived that help is not on the way can
the United States reasonably expect to obtain all possible intelligence
information from Padilla. . . . Providing him access to counsel now . . . would
break—probably irreparably—the sense of dependency and trust that the
74

See Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A1 (noting Padilla’s three-and-a-half-year detention at a military brig);
Deborah Sontag, A Videotape Offers a Window into a Terror Suspect’s Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2006, at A1 (noting Padilla was denied counsel for twenty-one of those months). Former Attorney
General Michael Mukasey, then the chief judge of the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, ultimately rebuffed DOJ and granted Padilla access to counsel. Philip Shenon & Benjamin
Weiser, Washington Outsider with Many Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A1.
75
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442–47.
76
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 62, at 43–44.
77
Id. at 43.
78
Id. at 6.
79
See Brief of Respondent at 43, Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 812830, at *43
(“Any deference to executive judgment that might be appropriate in battlefield determinations is wholly
absent here.”).
80
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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interrogators are attempting to create.81

The tone of Justice Stevens’s dissent for four Justices in Padilla differs
strikingly from his majority opinion in Rasul. Freed of the need to achieve a
majority, Justice Stevens wrote expansively and with passion about the
Judiciary’s essential role in constraining the Executive in order to preserve
“a free society,” even in the most challenging of circumstances.82 He
decried detention without counsel for interrogation purposes as reminiscent
of the Star Chamber and unlawful regardless of information procured.83 His
stirring opinion merits quotation at length:
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even
more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their
successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the
rule of law. Unconstrained executive detention for the purpose of investigating
and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber. Access
to counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and
mistreatment is the hallmark of due process.
Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers
to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons
from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be
justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract
information. Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure.
Whether the information so procured is more or less reliable than that acquired
by more extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to
remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of
tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.84

Justice Stevens also addressed the merits of Padilla’s claims, writing in a
footnote that he agreed with the Second Circuit that the “Non-Detention Act
prohibits—and the [AUMF] does not authorize—the protracted,
incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the United
States.”85
After holding Padilla for three and a half years as an “enemy
combatant,” the government successfully avoided further Supreme Court
review of the extremely difficult issues associated with applying that status
to someone detained on U.S. soil by, at the eleventh hour, transferring
Padilla out of military custody and trying him in a civilian court, on charges

81

Brief of Respondent, supra note 79, at 3 n.3 (omissions in original) (quoting Jacoby’s
declaration) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 62, at 10, 29
(relying upon Jacoby’s declaration).
82
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83
Id.
84
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
85
Id. at 464 n.8 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens thus disagreed with the Hamdi plurality on this
point, which he did not reach in Hamdi. See supra note 48.
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unrelated to the initial “dirty bomb” charge.86 After the transfer, the
Supreme Court denied review of the legality of his military detention.87
Three Justices dissented from the denial of certiorari.88 Justice Stevens, the
natural fourth vote to grant review, instead joined an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, which Chief Justice John Roberts also joined.89 Justice Kennedy’s
opinion explained that they denied review because of the transfer but
emphasized that the federal district court now “will be obliged to afford him
the protection, including the right to a speedy trial, guaranteed to all federal
criminal defendants” and that the court should respond promptly if the
government sought to transfer Padilla again to military control.90
Commentators speculated that Justice Stevens voted against taking the case
because Justice Kennedy, the presumed deciding vote, believed review of
the merits was premature and therefore the Court would lack five votes to
resolve the merits in the way Justice Stevens believed appropriate.91
86

Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); see
also Goodnough & Shane, supra note 74, at A21 (“After being held in isolation in a military brig in
South Carolina for three and a half years, Mr. Padilla . . . was transferred to civilian custody here last
year after the Supreme Court considered taking up his case.”).
87
The Fourth Circuit, which had held that Padilla’s military detention was within the President’s
authority, Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005), denied DOJ’s requests to vacate that
decision and authorize the transfer due to “at least an appearance that the government may be attempting
to avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.” Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th
Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court granted the application for transfer, Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084
(2006), and subsequently denied certiorari, Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
88
Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1064 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This case, here for
the second time, raises a question ‘of profound importance to the Nation[]’ . . . .” (quoting Padilla, 542
U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
89
Id. at 1063–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
90
Id. at 1064. The opinion also noted that in the future Padilla could seek a writ of habeas corpus
from the Court in an original action and cited the applicable Supreme Court rule. Id.
91
See, e.g., Marty Lederman, Reading Padilla’s Tea Leaves, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2006, 11:01
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/04/reading-padillas-tea-leaves. Padilla’s story continued. Padilla
was convicted and sentenced to more than seventeen years. Kirk Semple, Padilla Gets 17-Year Term for
Role in Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at A14. Federal district court Judge Marcia Cooke
found, in part, that the conditions of Padilla’s detention and interrogation had been “harsh” and that this
finding “warrant[ed] consideration in the sentencing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
government challenged the sentence as inadequate and on appeal a divided three-judge panel of the
Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118–19 (11th Cir.
2011). The majority agreed that harsh conditions of pretrial detention may justify a downward departure
but held that the district court had abused its discretion by “attach[ing] little weight to Padilla’s
extensive criminal history, [giving] no weight to his future dangerousness, compar[ing] him to criminals
who were not similarly situated, and [giving] unreasonable weight to the conditions of his pre-trial
confinement.” Id. at 1119. Separately, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s
dismissal of Padilla’s Bivens suit against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others for
alleged infringements of his constitutional rights. See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012),
aff’g 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 111277). The court found that “[s]pecial factors do counsel judicial hesitation in implying causes of action
for enemy combatants held in military detention.” Id. at 548. But see Stephen I. Vladeck, National
Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010) (arguing a Bivens remedy is

484

106:467 (2012)

“The Essence of a Free Society”

D. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Two years later, on June 29, 2006, Justice Stevens wrote for a fiveJustice majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.92 In an unusually long and
complex opinion focused on technical statutory interpretation rather than
constitutional principles, the Court held unlawful the Bush Administration’s
system of military commissions established outside of civilian federal
courts for the trial of certain noncitizens “for violations of the laws of war
and other applicable laws.”93 DOJ’s brief in support urged strong deference:
“Because the Military Order applies to alien enemy combatants who are
captured during the ongoing war with al Qaeda, both the traditional
deference this Court pays to the military justice system and the vital role
played by that system are at their pinnacle.”94 As usual, DOJ urged the
Court to dismiss the case and not reach the merits. The Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA), it argued, removed the Court’s jurisdiction, and even if
it did not, precedent required the Court to abstain until the final outcome of
Hamdan’s military commission process.95
On the merits, DOJ cited as authorization for the commissions the
DTA, the AUMF, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and the
President’s inherent constitutional authority.96 Regarding detainees’ claims
under international law, it argued that the President’s determination that the
Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda (and
therefore did not protect Salim Hamdan) was “binding on the courts”—or,
if not binding, the standard of review at a minimum “would surely be
extraordinarily deferential to the President.”97
Three Justices joined two dissenting opinions that would have upheld
the commissions. Chief Justice Roberts presumably would have provided a
fourth dissenting vote. He recused himself because as a judge on the D.C.
Circuit just days before President Bush nominated him to the Supreme
appropriate and that special factors of the kind the Lebron court considered are better addressed by
qualified immunity and state secrets doctrines).
92
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
93
Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918 (2002).
94
See Brief for Respondents at 13, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875, at *13.
95
See id. at 7, 15–16.
96
Id. at 15–23. To Hamdan’s argument that the military commissions were not “necessary” and
thus not authorized under the AUMF, the Administration responded: “This Court has recognized that
courts are not competent to second-guess judgments of the political branches regarding the extent of
force necessary to prosecute a war.” Id. at 19.
97
Id. at 38. President Bush issued a memorandum stating, “I also accept the legal conclusion of the
Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda
or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and
common Article 3 applies only to ‘armed conflict not of an international character.’” Memorandum from
President George W. Bush for the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 134, 134–35.
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Court, he joined the very opinion upholding military commissions that the
Court reversed in Hamdan.98 The D.C. Circuit had deferred to the
President’s view of Common Article 3, concluding that “the President’s
reasonable view of the provision must . . . prevail” in resolving ambiguity
in its meaning.99 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, essentially agreed
with the D.C. Circuit. He wrote that the majority “without acknowledging
its duty to defer to the President, adopts its own, admittedly plausible,
reading of Common Article 3,”100 and “its opinion openly flouts our wellestablished duty to respect the Executive’s judgment in matters of military
operations and foreign affairs.”101 Justice Scalia authored a second dissent,
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, which found that the DTA denied the
Court jurisdiction and in any event the Court should have abstained.102
On both the question of jurisdiction and the merits, Justice Stevens’s
opinion for the Court is striking for its refusal to abstain or give significant
consideration to the issue of deference. The Court held that the DTA did not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction and found DOJ “has identified no other
‘important countervailing interest’” to justify abstention.103 On the merits,
the Court found no need to reach the question of the President’s
constitutional authority to convene military commissions in the absence of
congressional authorization: the UCMJ allowed for the establishment of
military commissions but required compliance with certain specified
procedures as well as with the laws of war104—which the Bush system failed
to do. Specifically, the Court found that the UCMJ required the same
procedures used in courts martial “insofar as practicable” as well as the
procedures required under Common Article 3, including a “regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples.”105
Two aspects of the Court’s ruling merit special note for their effects
beyond military commissions. First, the Court’s only consideration of
deference was as applied to President Bush’s determination that it was
impracticable to apply to Hamdan’s military commission the rules and
principles of law governing criminal trials in federal courts.106 The Court
98

Linda Greenhouse, Detainee Case Will Pose Delicate Question for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2006, at A12.
99
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d 548 U.S. 557; see also id. at 44
(Williams, J., concurring) (concluding that Common Article 3 does apply to al Qaeda members captured
in Afghanistan but that the Geneva Convention is “not enforceable in courts of the United States”).
100
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 719 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101
Id. at 678.
102
Id. at 655 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 589 (majority opinion) (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716
(1996)).
104
Id. at 592–94.
105
Id. at 620, 630 (internal quotation mark omitted).
106
See id. at 623.
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declined to defer to the President’s decision not to use the rules for courts
martial, holding that the President had failed to make the required
determination that it was impracticable to do so and citing to Justice
Kennedy’s discussion of the difference in wording of the two
requirements.107 Even more striking, the Court without comment declined to
defer to (let alone accept as binding) the President’s interpretation of
Common Article 3. The Court instead found to the contrary that Common
Article 3 applied to the conflict with al Qaeda, with implications
devastating not only for President Bush’s military commissions, but also for
his “enhanced interrogation” policies that clearly did not comply with
Common Article 3.108
Second, the Court pointedly noted (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer) that the President “may not disregard limitations that
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers,” and that “[t]he Government does not argue otherwise.”109 The
Court, of course, knew that the Bush Administration in fact had argued
otherwise in other contexts, in support of claims of presidential authority to
disregard (or reinterpret) several other statutory limits on its
counterterrorism and war policies.110 While Justice Stevens limited the
comment to a footnote, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence quoted approvingly
the entirety of Justice Robert Jackson’s famous three-part scheme in his
Youngstown concurrence, highlighting that to the extent President Bush’s
military commissions did not comply with the UCMJ, they fell in zone
three where “his power is at its lowest ebb.”111 Justice Kennedy expounded
on the harms of presidential unilateralism and the “stability in time of
crisis” provided by statutes enacted as “the result of a deliberative and
reflective process engaging both of the political branches.”112
Justice Stevens lost Justice Kennedy and thus the majority on one
major issue: Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to reach whether the
specific charge of conspiracy against Hamdan was an offense against the
laws of war cognizable by military commission.113 Also, although Justice
Kennedy agreed that Common Article 3 applied to the commissions, he
would not have gone as far as the plurality in finding specific procedural
107

Id. at 622–24. Even assuming that President Bush’s determination “would be entitled to a
measure of deference,” “the only reason offered . . . is the danger posed by international terrorism” but
the record provided no specific reason for thinking standard court-martial procedures would not work.
Id. at 623 & n.51.
108
Id. at 629–33; see infra note 223 and accompanying text.
109
Id. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
110
See infra Part III.A.
111
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
112
Id. at 637.
113
Id. at 655.
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guarantees applicable.114 Justice Stevens declined to join a short
concurrence by Justice Breyer for four Justices (including Justice Kennedy)
that emphasized the President remained free to ask Congress to amend the
statutory requirements and give him the authority he believed he needed.115
President Bush promptly did so and, in direct response to Hamdan,
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).
E. Boumediene v. Bush
In the Supreme Court’s last opinion to date on the rights of the
Guantánamo detainees, Boumediene v. Bush,116 the Court for the first time
disagreed with both the President and Congress. Also for the first time,
Justice Stevens did not write an opinion; he joined Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion for five Justices, which held that in enacting the MCA,
Congress unconstitutionally deprived the detainees of habeas review
without providing an adequate alternative. Justice Stevens initially had
voted with Justice Kennedy to deny certiorari.117 After the experience of
losing the majority in Padilla, Justice Stevens apparently made the strategic
decision to wait to grant certiorari until Justice Kennedy agreed that review
was desirable, and then allowed him to write the opinion, in recognition of
his key position at the center of the Court on 9/11 detainee issues.118
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion for four Justices. He
agreed with DOJ that the Court should abstain from reaching the merits of
this “grossly premature” constitutional challenge and instead required the
detainees to exhaust remedies provided under the DTA that permitted
limited review of “enemy combatant” status.119 On the merits, the dissenters
found the DTA procedures constitutionally adequate.120 In a second dissent
also for four Justices, Justice Scalia noted that DOJ’s Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) had advised President Bush that the federal courts could not
exercise habeas jurisdiction over the Guantánamo detainees; Justice Scalia
accused the Court of a “game of bait-and-switch” with “the Nation’s

114

Id. at 654.
Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
116
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
117
Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328, 1328–29 (2007) (denying certiorari).
118
Professor Richard Fallon succinctly explained,
Alone among his colleagues, Justice Kennedy has voted with the majority in every single habeas
case stemming from the War on Terror. Justice Stevens may have signaled his recognition of
Justice Kennedy’s outcome-controlling influence when he declined to join three “liberal”
colleagues in voting to grant certiorari in the Boumediene case as long as Justice Kennedy
opposed a grant. Then, when Justice Kennedy changed his mind, Justice Stevens shifted his vote
too, possibly in anticipation that Kennedy would ally himself with the Court’s four liberals . . . .
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law
and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 376 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
119
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 801, 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
120
Id. at 808.
115
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Commander in Chief” that “will almost certainly cause more Americans to
be killed.”121
The Court’s majority found further delay unwarranted, given the
Court’s central role in upholding the Constitution against political branch
violations and the fact that the detainees already had been imprisoned for
years without judicial review.122 Unlike the statutory provision at issue in
Hamdan, a provision of the MCA enacted in response to Hamdan
unambiguously denied the federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
actions pending at the time of enactment.123 The Court therefore reached the
constitutional challenge and held that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause
applied to the Guantánamo detainees and that Congress had not provided a
constitutionally adequate substitute for habeas review.124
The process by which the Court decided to review Boumediene
exemplifies the central roles of Justices Stevens and Kennedy in the
detainee cases—and the centrality as well of the flawed nature of the Bush
Administration’s policies. When both Justices initially voted to deny
certiorari, they issued a jointly signed statement saying that review was
premature but that the Court would remain open to a renewed appeal if
circumstances warranted it.125 A few months later, Boumediene’s lawyer
filed a remarkable motion for reconsideration attaching an affidavit from an
army officer, Stephen Abramson, who had been a member of a military
review board making individual detention determinations. Abramson
reported that the process was badly flawed; commanding officers, for
example, pressed officers on the boards to decide in favor of detention.126
The Court responded with an unusual grant of certiorari just months after a
denial, suggesting that Justice Kennedy changed his mind in light of the
Abramson statement, and that Justice Stevens strategically waited for
Justice Kennedy and later assigned him the majority opinion.127
As is apparent from this review of the Court’s detainee cases, Justice
Stevens led the Court in upholding detainees’ rights by authoring key
opinions and building majorities in support of a strong judicial check on
121

Id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 765, 772–73; see also id. at 771 (“This Court may not impose a de facto suspension by
abstaining from these controversies.”).
123
Id. at 738–39.
124
Id. at 787–92.
125
Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328, 1329 (2007) (Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., respecting denial of
certiorari).
126
William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees’ Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2007, at A1.
127
Id. Court reporter Linda Greenhouse wrote of Justice Stevens’s vote, “The most plausible
explanation is that this canny tactician and strategist, who had managed to win Justice Kennedy’s vote
for his two earlier Guantánamo opinions, knew better than to risk losing that support by pushing his
colleague too far, too fast.” Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A11.
122
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presidential overreaching. Equally clear, Justice Stevens needed Justice
Kennedy—the only Justice who has voted with the majority in every
detainee case.128 Justice Kennedy, more than Justice Stevens, was willing to
avoid reaching the merits and to defer to the Executive on the merits: he
joined the Hamdi plurality’s less liberty-protective approach; wrote
separately in Rasul to emphasize the deference due the Executive; provided
a necessary fifth vote to dismiss in Padilla from which Justice Stevens
passionately dissented; concurred in Hamdan to limit its holding; and
initially voted against certiorari in Boumediene—as did Justice Stevens,
until Justice Kennedy was willing to hear the case. In the end, Justice
Kennedy rejected the government’s arguments and ruled for the detainees in
four out of five cases. After Justice Stevens’s retirement, Justice Kennedy
likely remains an essential vote for upholding contested rights of the
Guantánamo detainees and constraining unlawful executive action amid the
pressures of war and threats to national security.
II. TOWARD A BALANCED APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFERENCE
The Supreme Court’s 9/11 detainee decisions inspired extensive and
varied academic commentary, much of which addresses the role of the
federal judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the appropriate level of
deference due the Executive on matters of foreign affairs. Some
commentators celebrate the Court’s willingness to stand up to the Executive
Branch and safeguard the rule of law; others express grave concern about
the harmful, even horrific consequences they fear might follow the Court’s
overreaching. Among those who agree that the Court was right to find the
challenged policies unlawful, some nonetheless question the Court’s failure
to address deference.
Justice Stevens is featured not only for his lead role in the detainee
cases, but also for what may seem a contradictory pro-deference position
for the unanimous Court in Chevron, the landmark 1984 ruling that
established standards affording considerable judicial deference to certain
executive interpretations of statutes.129 As discussed, the detainee cases
turned in part on whether the Court would defer to the Executive Branch’s
controversial interpretations of various statutory and treaty provisions: the
2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), the NonDetention Act, the federal habeas statute, and provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, especially Common Article 3. A recurring subject of
commentary considers Chevron’s relevance in the foreign affairs context:
whether and under what circumstances the Court should afford Chevron-
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See supra note 118.
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like deference to the Executive Branch’s interpretations of federal statutory
and treaty provisions that involve foreign affairs.130
The recent flurry of scholarship, rich in descriptive and normative
analysis, contrasts with the Court’s longstanding inattention to the
theoretical basis for foreign relations deference. As Professor Curtis
Bradley observed, writing before 9/11: “In most of its deference decisions,
the Supreme Court has simply assumed, or has asserted in a conclusory
fashion, that foreign affairs should in fact make a difference.”131 Bradley
cited the often quoted 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision as the rare exception.132
The Court’s post-9/11 opinions, although enormously consequential in their
rejection of both strong deference and the President’s policies, provided
remarkably little additional guidance about the nature of foreign affairs
deference. Most instructive is the Hamdi plurality’s discussion of the
judiciary’s essential role in protecting individual liberty against the power
of the Executive even during wartime.133
Hamdan, at the other extreme, barely acknowledged the issue. The
Court purported to rely on a relatively straightforward application of legal
requirements that President Bush’s commissions failed to meet.134 Many
commentators, however, have argued persuasively that the relevant
statutory and treaty provisions were not so unambiguous, and that
something more must have motivated the Court’s interpretation.135 One
illustration of the Court’s generally undertheorized approach to foreign
affairs deference is, as Professor Robert Chesney observed, the
juxtaposition of Hamdan’s “fail[ure] even to mention the deference
doctrine” in construing the Geneva Conventions, against the Court’s
invocation of treaty deference in another decision issued just one day

130

For a thorough assessment of the related question of appropriate judicial deference to the
Executive Branch’s factual judgments on national security matters, see Robert M. Chesney, National
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009).
131
Bradley, supra note 27, at 663.
132
Id. at 663–64 (“But in a few instances—most notably in its 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision—it has
attempted an explanation.”).
133
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). As
discussed in Part I of this Article, several other opinions in the Court’s detainee cases also addressed the
issue of wartime deference to the Executive when individual liberty is at stake.
134
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575–76 (2006) (“Ordinary principles of statutory
construction suffice to rebut the Government’s theory . . . .”).
135
This is true even of commentators who generally praise Hamdan. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein,
Justice Stevens and the Expert Executive, 99 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1304–05 (2011).
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earlier.136 Chesney concluded that “the deference doctrine appears more
unsettled and indeterminate than ever before.”137
Given this vacuum, some deference proponents look to Justice
Stevens’s Chevron opinion, which, in a wholly domestic context, addressed
both the mechanics of, and justifications for, judicial deference to executive
agency statutory interpretations. In the course of upholding an
Environmental Protection Agency interpretation of the Clean Air Act, the
Chevron Court articulated a two-step test for judicial review of certain
executive agency interpretations of statutes they administer.138 First, the
court considers whether Congress has spoken clearly to the issue, and if so,
the court (and the agency) must give effect to that intent.139 If Congress was
silent or its intent was ambiguous, step two directs the court to defer to a
reasonable construction of the statute by the administering agency, even if
the court would have preferred a different interpretation.140
The Chevron Court explained the justifications for deference in terms
of functionalism and democratic theory: “Judges are not experts in the field,
and are not part of either political branch of the Government,”141 while the
administering agencies possess superior expertise and political
accountability by virtue of serving an elected President. Chevron rests
further on a theory of delegation: Congress is assumed to have delegated
resolution of the ambiguous question to the expert agency. As
commentators have noted, this assumption is based on a fiction because
Congress typically does not consider the question of who will fill gaps with
regard to a particular statute.142 The assumption is that Congress would
prefer the gap be filled based on the policy judgments of the administering
agency, given its expertise and location within a branch of government
headed by an elected president, rather than by a reviewing court.143
136

Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty
Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1732–33 (2007) (“[T]he Court had expressly invoked the
deference doctrine just one day before it issued Hamdan, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon . . . . By failing
even to mention the deference doctrine the next day in Hamdan, the Court ensured that questions would
arise as to the doctrine’s scope and significance.” (footnote omitted)).
137
Id. at 1727; see also id. at 1734–35 (“[T]he details of the methodology are not entirely certain,
and there is considerable room for debate regarding the extent to which courts are obliged to or
consistently do follow it.”).
138
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
139
Id. at 842–43.
140
Id. at 843.
141
Id. at 865.
142
See, e.g., David Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 203 (arguing that “some version of constructive—or perhaps more frankly said, fictional—intent
must operate in judicial efforts to delineate the scope of Chevron” and “this construction should arise
from and reflect candid policy judgments”).
143
The Court explained in Chevron:
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated
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Congress retains full authority to clarify the reach and meaning of the law
through subsequent legislation.
In his 2000 article, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, Professor
Bradley suggested insights to be gained from the application of Chevron’s
perspective to the foreign affairs context. In his view, Chevron aids in
developing a path between two imperfect extremes: near-absolute CurtissWright deference, on the one hand, and the inadequate respect for the
Executive’s expertise and constitutional role advocated by Professor Harold
Koh and other Curtiss-Wright critics, on the other.144 Bradley’s illustrative
applications leaned toward relatively strong deference, but his prescriptions
depended on the context. He also emphasized his limited objective: he
sought not to set forth a completely developed alternative approach, but “to
suggest a different way of thinking about the deference issue—one that
sheds new light on the question and at least begins to point the way to a
better approach.”145 Bradley was writing a year before 9/11 and thus in a
context devoid of issues specific to the terrorist attacks and the Bush
Administration’s responses.
Although some lower courts afforded strong deference to the Bush
Administration’s policies, the Supreme Court, in reversing those decisions
and finding the policies unlawful, adopted neither traditional strong
deference nor a modified Chevron deference to the Executive. Hamdan’s
rejection of the Bush Administration’s system of military commissions left
Congress with the last say on the issue, as Chevron typically does (as long
as Congress comports with constitutional limitations). By not deferring,
however, the Hamdan Court in effect reversed the Chevron presumption by
requiring the Executive to go to Congress to attain desired policies—which
President Bush did after Hamdan—rather than allowing the Executive to
act while leaving Congress the authority to undo unwanted executive
policies, as in Chevron.146

policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who
have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
144
Bradley, supra note 27, at 650; see also supra text accompanying notes 27–31.
145
Bradley, supra note 27, at 667.
146
Hamdan’s lawyer, Professor Neal Katyal, described seeking to persuade the Court that the
default rule should be against the government because a decision in the President’s favor could not be
easily overcome by Congress given the presidential veto. Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld:
The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 94–95 (2006).
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Professor Cass Sunstein is prominent among post-9/11 commentators
who call for Chevron-like foreign affairs deference; he also is renowned for
his scholarship on Chevron in its original domestic context and for his
general advocacy of judicial minimalism. Sunstein argues for a strong
version of Chevron deference to the Executive’s interpretations of
ambiguities in the AUMF, except where constitutionally protected interests
are at stake: “[T]he President receives the kind of super-strong deference
that derives from the combination of Chevron with what are plausibly taken
to be his constitutional responsibilities.”147 Sunstein proposed this standard
in response to a 2005 article in the Harvard Law Review coauthored by
Professor Bradley and Professor Jack Goldsmith, after both returned to
academia following service in the Bush Administration.148 Bradley and
Goldsmith’s ambitious article developed a framework for interpreting the
AUMF and tackled some of the most difficult questions that arise in its
application,149 including with respect to military detention and military
commissions.150 On issues of deference, the authors notably did not repeat
Bradley’s pre-9/11 call for Chevron deference or any particular measure of
deference to the Executive’s interpretations, expressly leaving that open,151
while urging respect for longstanding executive practice and the law of war
in interpreting the AUMF.152 Professor Sunstein laments their omission of
Chevron and calls for greater emphasis on administrative law deference
principles and less on the law of war.153
147

Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2671 (2005)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War]; see Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War,
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50 [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimalism at War].
148
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005). Curtis Bradley spent 2004 working in the State Department’s Legal
Adviser’s Office. Curtis A. Bradley, DUKE L. FAC., http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/bradleyc (last visited
May 18, 2012). Jack Goldsmith served from 2002 to 2004, first as Special Counsel to the Defense
Department’s General Counsel and then as the Assistant Attorney General heading the Office of Legal
Counsel. JACK GOLDSMITH, http://www.jackgoldsmith.org (last visited May 18, 2012).
149
Their approach notably tempers that taken by the Administration they both recently served. But
among the key Bush Administration interpretations they support is the view that Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions does not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, a position the Court later rejected
in Hamdan. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 148, at 2115 n.304.
150
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan cited the Bradley and Goldsmith article for its
detailed review of the law governing military commissions. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
595 (2006).
151
Although they set forth a framework for interpreting the AUMF, they relegated the possibility of
deference to the Bush Administration to a footnote and declared it beyond the scope of the article. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 148, at 2084 n.150, 2107.
152
See id. at 2085–2100.
153
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, supra note 147, at 2664. For two additional valuable
perspectives published in the same issue, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S.
War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005); Mark Tushnet,
Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005). Bradley and
Goldsmith replied to all three responses in Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The War
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Sunstein continued in this vein in a 2007 Yale Law Journal debate with
a provocative article coauthored with Eric Posner, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, that advocated, for foreign relations matters, expanding
Chevron deference substantially beyond Chevron.154 Posner and Sunstein’s
call for strong deference, even to executive interpretations that conflict with
international law, came at a time of growing public attention to the Bush
Administration’s claims of sweeping executive powers, including the power
to act contrary to domestic and international law. Salim Hamdan’s
victorious counsel Neal Katyal and his coauthor Derek Jinks responded
with Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, which detailed the undesirable
“radical implications” of allowing the Executive essentially to disregard
international law aimed at constraining executive action.155 Writing
separately elsewhere, Professor Katyal called for bureaucratic expertise to
play a strong role in deference analysis and also for transferring core Office
of Legal Counsel functions to a new “Director of Adjudication” insulated
from political influences through removal protections.156
Sharp differences clearly persist, but fundamental points of near
consensus also emerge. Few commentators continue to defend absolute (or
near-absolute) deference of the kind described in Curtiss-Wright or initially
claimed by the Bush Administration. Most, including counsel for detainees,
acknowledge that the Executive’s functional advantages and Article II
authorities support some form of foreign affairs deference in some
circumstances. Consensus also recognizes that, analogous to Chevron,
competing imperatives include appropriate respect for executive expertise
and political accountability on the one hand, and preservation of the rule of
law and individual rights through judicially enforced constraints on
unlawful executive action on the other.
The substantial variations within this broad, evolving middle ground is
unsurprising, especially in light of similar indeterminacy and controversy
around Chevron in its domestic context.157 Justice Stevens has remarked that
on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 2683 (2005).
154
See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170 (2007). Sunstein and Posner acknowledged that Chevron in the domestic context calls only for
deference to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of certain types of statutes in some circumstances
(including interpretations adopted by agencies exercising delegated authority to make rules or conduct
adjudications), but they suggested dispensing with some of these limitations in the foreign affairs
context. See id. at 1195–97, 1210–15; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and
National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
155
Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230,
1233–34, 1245 (2007) (quoting Posner & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1177).
156
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2337 (2006); Katyal, supra note 146, at 115.
157
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 426 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (“The much-debated question
whether Chevron has had any impact on the degree of deference judges actually give to agencies
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when he wrote Chevron, he intended simply to restate established law.158
Indeed, he wrote for a unanimous Court.159 But in the decades since, as
Chevron became a landmark decision, the Court has divided closely and
acrimoniously over how best to apply it.160 Justices Stevens and Scalia often
fell on opposite sides of key Chevron domestic issues, as they did on the
rights of noncitizen detainees and the deference due the Executive on
foreign affairs issues. Just three years after Chevron, Justice Scalia declared
that the Court had “eviscerated” Chevron, in a case in which Justice Stevens
wrote for a five-Justice majority.161 Thus began a decades-long argument
about the role of legislative history in determining the existence of statutory
ambiguity.162 Since 2000, the Court has denied agencies Chevron deference
in several high-profile domestic cases, with Justice Stevens and Justice
Scalia on opposing sides. The Court has declined to defer to the

remains unresolved.”); Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for
Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 810 (2011) (“It is perhaps more than a little ironic that
Chevron has gained interest from foreign relations scholars at the same time that scholars of
administrative law have been demonstrating with increasing persuasiveness how limited the impact of
Chevron has been in cases reviewing agency statutory interpretations.”); id. at 810–817 (summarizing
Court cases limiting Chevron and citing academic commentary). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (noting that the Court gave
Chevron deference in only 8.3% of agency statutory interpretation cases from 1984 to 2005).
158
See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 529 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Judicial deference to agencies’ views on statutes they administer was not born in
Chevron . . . .”); Merrill, supra note 157, at 420 & n.76; see also Kathryn A. Watts, From Chevron to
Massachusetts: Justice Stevens’s Approach to Securing the Public Interest, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021,
1022 (2010) (“Justice Stevens seeks to effectuate Congress’s own animating goals, paying particularly
close attention to Congress’s protective and remedial purposes. . . . [H]is purposivist approach to
statutory interpretation often enables him to give agencies the leeway they need to achieve Congress’s
broad protective or remedial goals and conversely to check agencies when they act counter to
Congress’s purposes.”).
159
Although Chevron was unanimous, only six Justices took part. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (noting that Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not take
part).
160
Professor Thomas Merrill provided an interesting analysis of how Chevron achieved landmark
status, which he attributed to two factors: the ascendency of its approach first on the D.C. Circuit and
then “migration” to the Supreme Court, and its “aggressive promotion by the executive branch lawyers”
who saw the potential in it for greater deference to administrative interpretations. Merrill, supra note
157, at 422–26. He concluded that Chevron “became great not because of the inherent importance of the
issue presented, but because the opinion happened to be written in such a way that key actors in the legal
system later decided to make it a great case.” Id. at 427.
161
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
162
Even earlier, Justice Stevens signaled the division to come. In a 1986 dissent, he alone would
have invalidated a regulation as inconsistent with a statute’s clear meaning, and he described the eightJustice majority opinion as “reflect[ing] an absence of judgment and of judging” and “employ[ing] a
reasoning so formulaic that it trivializes the art of judging.” Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S.
974, 985, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s finding of statutory
ambiguity).
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government’s attempted regulation of tobacco products,163 refusal to
regulate greenhouse gases,164 and attempted prosecution of physicians who
assist terminally ill patients to commit suicide.165
Commentators who address the usefulness of the Chevron analogy in
the foreign affairs context similarly span a large divide on the deference
spectrum. Some disagreements mirror hot debates in the domestic context.
Most fundamentally, in both contexts, the choice by a commentator to
privilege one of Chevron’s twin virtues—accountability or expertise—often
proves determinative. Other disputes include whether the AUMF and the
UCMJ are comparable to the Administrative Procedure Act166 and the
Freedom of Information Act,167 which the Court has found are not subject to
Chevron deference because they are aimed at constraining the Executive.
And are executive positions first developed in the context of litigation
deserving of deference? Differences specific to foreign affairs include how
one views the constitutional allocation of relevant authorities and the proper
place of international law.168
Impressive scholarship since the initial Harvard Law Review and Yale
Law Journal debates evaluates such questions of foreign affairs deference,
as well as related questions that arise in the context of claims for
compensation by alleged victims of unlawful detention, surveillance, or
interrogation.169 Before moving in Part III to one respect in which the
literature seems relatively incomplete, this Part concludes by endorsing a
dominant emergent strand that takes a balanced, nonabsolutist approach to
foreign affairs deference. A balanced approach that supports some measure
of deference in circumstances that reflect executive expertise and
accountability seems clearly correct as a normative matter and also enjoys
substantial doctrinal support.170
Even prior to 9/11, the Court did not consistently apply CurtissWright-like deference. Professor David Sloss argues that the Hamdan
Court’s posture of nondeference to the Executive’s treaty interpretation is
consistent with the Court’s approach in the United States’ first half century,
163

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
165
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
166
5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
167
Id. § 552.
168
Various commentators, for example, address the import of the Charming Betsy doctrine, which
directs courts where possible to construe statutes to avoid conflicts with international law. See Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
169
See infra note 293.
170
One caution: positions at the extreme may be repackaged in the guise of Chevron. For example,
among those who have praised the invocation of Chevron by Posner and Sunstein for foreign affairs is
John Yoo, a harsh critic of Hamdan and supporter of a more extreme version of Sunstein’s “superstrong” deference. See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 195–96 (2006).
164
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which suggests constitutional text, structure, and history are not dispositive
and leave room for the consideration of functional concerns.171 More recent
precedent and practice also are less determinate than commonly believed.
An influential 1994 study by Professor David Bederman had found that the
Executive’s treaty interpretation was the best indicator of the Court’s own
interpretation from the 1950s to the early 1990s.172 The Court regularly talks
of giving “great weight” to the Executive’s treaty interpretations, including
in an opinion issued just one day before the Court all but ignored the
deference issue in Hamdan.173 More recent scholarship, however,
persuasively questions the conventional narrative about how much
deference the Court actually has given the Executive. Professor Robert
Chesney in particular helpfully situates the historical development of
deference to executive treaty interpretations among foreign relations
deference generally, including Curtiss-Wright.174 In seeking to isolate actual
deference from other influences in Rehnquist-era treaty cases, Professor
Chesney finds persuasive evidence to counter Bederman’s conclusion.175
Recent works by Professor Chesney and Professor Deborah Pearlstein
are especially notable for contributing theoretical support and practical
detail toward an optimal intermediate approach. They do not address nor
agree upon all particulars, but they both move the conversation usefully in a
direction closer to Professors Jinks and Katyal—and their advocacy of
attention to the actual internal processes followed—than to Professors
Posner and Sunstein, who tend more toward near-absolute deference with
limited exceptions. After reviewing a variety of “intermediate deference”
positions, Professor Chesney makes a strong case for limiting deference to
treaty interpretations reached through Chevron-style rulemaking or a
similarly formal legal opinion by a relevant department—and not, for
example, positions merely adopted in litigation.176 This seems appropriate
for statutes as well as treaties. Interpretations adopted in the course of
litigation do not reflect only the Executive’s effort to bring expertise and
judgment to bear on achieving the best legal interpretation of the provision;
they also may reflect, for example, government litigators’ judgments about
what will prevail in the courts or what will maximize broader governmental
interests such as a desire to maximize the government’s own authority.
171

David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical
Exception, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2007).
172
David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 1015
(1994).
173
Chesney, supra note 136, at 1727 (discussing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006)).
174
Id. at 1733–51.
175
Id. at 1754–58. He does not, though, go as far as Professor Martin Flaherty who also contributes
to the foreign affairs deference debate and colorfully suggests, “Much like a blimp, the doctrine appears
ponderous but in reality has little weight.” Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After
9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 127 (2011).
176
Chesney, supra note 136, at 1773.
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Professor Pearlstein’s comprehensive assessment of both statutory and
treaty deference in the foreign relations context also persuasively negates an
absolute or “super-strong” approach. She concludes with the suggestion that
the most appropriate form in the foreign affairs context may not be Chevron
deference at all, but lesser Skidmore deference, under which courts defer to
an executive interpretation only to the degree to which it is persuasive and
after considering the actual processes by which it was reached.177 Skidmore
deference seems too far from current practice to be palatable to the Court
and, similar to Katyal’s creative but ultimately misguided “Director of
Adjudication,” might in fact go too far in its focus on bureaucratic expertise
to the near exclusion of political accountability and presidential direction. A
serious challenge in applying Chevron, which is heightened in the foreign
affairs context, is distinguishing between desirable political accountability
and undesirable politicization.178 In any event, Pearlstein’s thoughtful
analysis adds to the deference debate the relevance of theories of judicial
power; she suggests in particular that courts should consider what is
necessary to maintain constitutional equilibrium in the context not only of
constitutional adjudiciation, but also of the deference due statutory and
treaty interpretations.179 Pearlstein is correct to highlight the broader
separation of powers context and also to advocate some measure of judicial
attention to internal processes, which encourages (in the first instance)
executive interpretive processes and related policymaking that in fact do
reflect executive expertise and principled deliberation.
The deference debate’s rich normative discussion thus supports and
helps delineate an appropriately balanced intermediate approach to foreign
affairs deference. Less complete (and the subject of the next Part) is its
descriptive account of why the post-9/11 Court did not endorse even
moderate deference and what that lack of deference portends. Because the
Court said so little on the subject, any account is necessarily speculative,
and the reasons are almost certainly multiple and complex. They
undoubtedly include the Court’s recognition of its special role in
safeguarding individual liberty against executive abuse—a role the Hamdi

177

Pearlstein, supra note 157, at 851–52; see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Pearlstein and Katyal are correct to highlight the importance of agency expertise, which Sunstein
excessively discounts in favor of accountability. But agency experts themselves may develop tendencies
toward institutional absolutism (including in support of executive power) that can be appropriately
tempered by the judgment of officials who are more politically accountable. Recent scholarship
demonstrates the complexity of issues of political accountability. See, e.g., David J. Barron, From
Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1095, 1095–1102 (2008) (discussing competing views and distinctions between agency
politicization and centralization).
179
Pearlstein, supra note 157, at 836–42 (describing “equilibrium theory”).
178
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plurality expressly embraced180—and a determination never to repeat the
mistake of Korematsu’s excessive deference.181
Beyond that, commentators offer helpful speculation. Posner and
Sunstein characterize the Hamdan Court’s neglect of the analogy to
Chevron deference as “a puzzling and important omission”182 and seem to
favor the conclusion that “Hamdan is simply wrong” in some respects;183
their alternative “most sympathetic reconstruction” would read Hamdan as
resting on a special requirement for criminal trials of a clear congressional
statement to “authorize a departure from standard adjudicative forms and
procedures.”184 Other explanations draw upon Justice Stevens’s position in
Chevron to understand Hamdan: as Professors Katyal and Pearlstein note,
the Court (and especially Justice Stevens) sometimes has been unwilling to
afford Chevron deference in the domestic context where the facts suggest
the Executive did not actually rely on the views of agency experts185—
which was also true of President Bush’s military commissions.186 Katyal
predicts that the Court in future cases similarly will require “deliberative
and sober bureaucratic decisionmaking.”187 Pearlstein describes the Court’s
post-9/11 approach as calling into question and rendering “increasingly

180

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
182
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1178.
183
Id. at 1225.
184
Id. at 1225–26.
185
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), is one clear example. Justice Stevens, writing for
the Court, found that although the EPA possessed relevant expertise it could have applied to the
regulation of greenhouse gases, it had not actually done so. Id. at 533–34. Instead, the Court cited
potential harm to the President’s ability to negotiate with foreign nations, which fell within the State
Department’s purview. Id. This reasoning is reminiscent of Justice Stevens’s constitutional ruling in his
very first majority opinion, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), which held that the
authority of an executive branch agency depended on whether it was the agency with relevant expertise
and jurisdiction—there, to limit certain federal jobs to U.S. citizens.
186
Pearlstein puts it well in describing Hamdan: “Expertise in the Executive was not a functional
advantage to be assumed; it was a virtue executives would have to demonstrate.” Pearlstein, supra note
135, at 1310. Katyal similarly concludes that the Hamdan Court “consciously refused to award
deference to the presidential determinations at issue because they lacked support from the bureaucracy,
and in particular the Judge Advocates General and the State Department.” Katyal, supra note 146, at
105.
187
Katyal, supra note 146, at 105. This prediction, however, seems a bit too narrowly focused on
the lack of bureaucratic support and overconfident in generalizing from Hamdan to predict the Court
will require evidence of such support in future cases. Posner and Sunstein object that the Court has not
generally required this evidence in the past in the domestic context and should not, especially on foreign
affairs questions. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1214. Katyal’s brief analysis of the
accountability factor—particularly his suggestion that Hamdan would have been more difficult to win in
Bush’s first term because voters could have held him accountable by not reelecting him—is
unpersuasive, in terms of how courts are likely to approach foreign affairs deference; in any event, his
useful point is to elevate the need for bureaucratic expertise. See Katyal, supra note 146, at 107.
181
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untenable” the standard historical account that “the Court will defer to
executive views in core matters of foreign relations.”188
As this Article’s next Part elaborates, one additional factor may have
played a substantial role in the post-9/11 Court’s refusal to defer and its
willingness to reach the merits of detainees’ claims: the exceptional
circumstances surrounding those cases, and especially the Bush
Administration’s flawed approach to its own constitutional authority.
Absent similar circumstances, the Court may afford significant deference to
executive interpretations involving foreign affairs without, for example,
invariably requiring evidence of “deliberative and sober bureaucratic
decisionmaking.”189 In any event, attention to those exceptional
circumstances helpfully informs analysis of both judicial deference and
nonjudicial checks on the legality of executive action.
III. PRESIDENTIAL ASSERTIONS OF PRECLUSIVE WAR POWERS
One aspect of the rich, post-9/11 academic debate over foreign affairs
deference seems incomplete: remarkably little relates the deference issue to
the extraordinary nature of the legal interpretations to which the Court
refused to defer.190 Books, articles, congressional hearings, ethics inquiries,
and blog posts all have detailed the notoriously flawed nature of some early
legal interpretations provided by the Department of Justice’s Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) to inform the terrorism policies at issue. As the Court
and the world learned, initially through leaks from an excessively secretive
Administration, OLC’s legal analysis on some war and terrorism issues did
not adhere to traditional standards and processes aimed at achieving
accurate and principled interpretations of statutes and treaties. In addition to
adopting an extreme view of executive power, in the most egregious cases,
OLC’s analysis and the processes it followed seemed distorted to serve
desired policies, chief among them, the use of harsh and unlawful methods
of interrogation, including torture.191
188

Pearlstein, supra note 157, at 785–86.
Katyal, supra note 146, at 105.
190
Along these lines, Professors Katyal and Pearlstein discuss one important particular aspect of the
context of Hamdan: the possible relevance of the absence of experts within the Executive Branch in the
development of the military commissions. Professor Katyal also has written of his efforts in litigating
Hamdan to take advantage of the broader context of the controversial Bush policies. See supra Part II. I
also have written elsewhere about the relevance of Hamdan’s context. See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Story
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Trying Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER
STORIES 447 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
191
I have written elsewhere and testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about deficiencies
in the legal advice and processes followed by the Bush Administration’s OLC. See Secret Law and the
Threat to Democratic and Accountable Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Michael B. Mukasey to Be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
189
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It is a simple point. At least by the time of Hamdan, the Court may
have felt that even to cite traditional deference standards might signal
approval of what it knew to be fundamentally flawed interpretations,
processes, and policies by an Administration that had failed to honor core
rule-of-law values. The Bush Administration can be viewed as, in effect,
having forfeited its claim to deference through its failure to fulfill
responsibilities of a constitutional dimension and of direct relevance to
Chevron’s theory of delegated authority: the Executive’s obligation to take
care that the law is faithfully interpreted and executed, to respect the
constitutional roles of Congress and the courts, and to act in the transparent
manner essential to democratic accountability. The Court may have
deferred so little because it believed that this unusual category of legal
interpretations simply did not merit traditional deference.
A cogent assessment that reflects this context came in a blog post
about Hamdan from former Solicitor General and OLC head Walter
Dellinger:
[T]he court confronted and rejected a deep theory of the Constitution that had
been developed by the incumbent administration and was invoked to justify
perhaps hundreds of executive decisions . . . that at least appeared to violate
valid acts of Congress. The rejection of that imperial claim is what is important
about this case.
It’s
not
about
the
military
commissions. . . . As
Marty
Lederman . . . said . . . , future historians are about as likely to think of
Hamdan as a “military commissions case” as they are to think of Youngstown
Sheet & Steel v. Sawyer as a decision about “steel mill law.” Hamdan is about
the OLC torture memo; and it’s about whether the president can refuse to
comply with the McCain Amendment. It’s about all those laws the president
says, as he signs them, that he will not commit to obey, if in his view foreign
relations or deliberative processes of the executive or other matters may be
affected. And, by the way, he won’t even commit to tell Congress he is not
obeying the law. That is what it’s about.192

Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007). In these sources, I describe the OLC’s
traditional functions, processes, and interpretive stance. I also discussed and appended a document I
coauthored in which nineteen former OLC lawyers set forth ten longstanding, nonpartisan principles that
have guided OLC’s work, in response to what we saw as dangerous deviations from practice in OLC’s
advice on the legality of extreme interrogation techniques. The first principle states, “OLC should
provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the
administration’s pursuit of desired policies.” WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (2004), reprinted in Johnsen, supra, at 1603.
192
Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Conversation: Still “the Most Important Decision on
Presidential Power Ever,” SLATE (June 30, 2006, 6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2144476.
Dellinger was referencing a conversation he had with Professor Marty Lederman shortly after the Court
decided Hamdan. (Dellinger served as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC during the Clinton
Administration, and Lederman served at OLC for periods under Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama.)
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The Court of course did not say any of this in Hamdan. Nor did it use
more traditional language of deference and find the Bush Administration’s
views unreasonable. Those who support a vibrant judiciary, strongly
protective of individual rights against unlawful governmental action,
understandably may prefer to interpret the Court’s silence as a marked shift
away from foreign affairs deference. Litigants challenging governmental
action surely will seek to generalize from the lack of deference. Taken
together, the rulings certainly constitute a definitive rejection of the nearabsolute foreign affairs deference reflected in the Curtiss-Wright dicta and
propounded by the Bush Administration. They reinforce the central lesson
of the Court’s abject failure in Korematsu, cautioning against excessive
deference in cases involving individual liberties.193 They also invite legal
scholars to develop (as they have) thoughtful intermediate approaches, the
desirability of which are further encouraged by the apparent absence, at
least so far, of the harmful consequences for national security that the
dissenting Justices and Bush Administration officials predicted would result
from the Court’s intervention.194 No genuine dispute remains that the legal
advice was badly defective. Officials from both political parties, and even
from within the Bush Administration, condemned it,195 though that
consensus is sometimes lost—occasionally intentionally obfuscated—in
partisan disputes about counterterrorism policies.196
193

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Boumediene charged that the majority’s approach “will almost
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827–28 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 121.
195
See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007) (quoted infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text); id. at 161 (“No one
except [Vice President Dick Cheney’s Counsel David] Addington disputed that the opinions I had
withdrawn and redone (or started to redo) were deeply flawed.”); Press Release, Sen. Lindsey Graham,
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: Opening Statement for Detainee & Interrogation Hearing
(June 17, 2008) (“I have long made clear I believe the [Bush] Administration’s lawyers used bizarre
legal theories to justify harsh interrogation techniques. . . . I could go on and on about the legal analysis
that any first year law student could poke holes in.”); see also Editorial, The Torturers’ Manifesto, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at WK9 (“These memos are not an honest attempt to set the legal limits on
interrogations, which was the authors’ statutory obligation. They were written to provide legal immunity
for acts that are clearly illegal, immoral and a violation of this country’s most basic values.”).
196
This fact also is clouded by the confusing conclusion of the Office of Professional
Responsibility’s (OPR) exhaustive investigation into a difficult question that goes beyond the
deficiencies in OLC’s legal advice: whether the advice was so egregiously flawed that it merited
sanctions against the top lawyers responsible. In its 261-page report, OPR detailed the numerous legal
errors and concluded that Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, who headed OLC, and his deputy, John
Yoo, had committed professional misconduct that merited referral to their respective state bar
disciplinary authorities. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT:
INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING
TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 260 (2009). The OPR report quotes, for example, former Attorney General
Michael Mukasey calling one of the OLC memos a “slovenly mistake.” Id. at 9. A subsequent acting
head of OLC under President Bush, Daniel Levin, described his own reaction as “this is insane, who
194
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As a purely predictive matter, however, the Court’s 9/11 detainee
opinions probably do not signal as wholesale a rejection of foreign affairs
deference as some commentators hope and others fear.197 Under those
decisions, the Court might afford substantial deference to a future
Administration’s legal interpretations on similar foreign affairs matters.
Appreciation of this possibility is important regardless of one’s views and
hopes. Unrealistic expectations about what the decisions portend could
distract from the essential truth that protecting against unlawful executive
action always has and always will require more than the possibility of
judicial review. It requires close attention to the legality of executive action,
and the quality of executive legal interpretation, from other forces with the
potential to provide meaningful checks: Congress, the press, the public,
nongovernmental organizations, and individuals and entities within the
Executive Branch. Also important to future meaningful checks is a shared
public understanding of what precisely was wrong with the legal
interpretations that underlay the early Bush Administration policies.
The brief review that follows establishes at least two vital facts. First,
as section A below describes, when the Supreme Court issued each of its
9/11 detainee rulings, much was publicly available and widely known about
the flawed nature of the Executive’s extreme claims of authority. In
litigating before the Court, the Bush Administration emphasized narrower
justifications for its policies than those upon which it initially relied and
downplayed inflammatory claims of presidential authority to violate
statutes and treaties. The Administration also went to exceptional lengths to
keep details of its actions and supportive OLC memos or other legal
justifications secret from the public and Congress. But by the time the 9/11
wrote this?” Id. at 124. Whether those egregious errors constitute professional misconduct that warrants
referral, as OPR concluded, is a much more difficult question. Indeed, on review, Associate Deputy
Attorney General David Margolis decided to “not adopt” OPR’s conclusion because in his judgment, the
attorneys had not “violate[d] a clear obligation or standard.” Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc.
Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Attorney Gen. & Deputy Attorney Gen. 2, 68 (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter
Margolis Memo], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf.
Some Republican Senators and John Yoo himself have falsely described Margolis’s determination as a
vindication of OLC’s advice. See The Office of Professional Responsibility Investigation into the Office
of Legal Counsel Memoranda: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010)
(statements of various Senators throughout); cf. John Yoo, My Gift to President Obama, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 24, 2010, at A17 (arguing President Obama should be grateful to him for “winning a drawn-out
fight to protect his powers as commander in chief to wage war and keep Americans safe”). In fact,
Margolis agreed that Bybee and Yoo’s legal advice contained “significant flaws” and reflected “poor
judgment,” and he concluded, “John Yoo’s loyalty to his own ideology and convictions clouded his
view of his obligation to his client.” Margolis Memo, supra, at 67–68.
197
Professor Sunstein has found that courts of appeals upheld national security policies at a very
high rate during President Bush’s administration, and that the rate did not change after the Supreme
Court’s decisions upholding detainees’ claims, suggesting a continued very high degree of judicial
deference. Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269, 271 (“The government loses only 15% of the litigated cases—a lower figure
than in almost all other domains of federal law.”).
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detainee cases reached the Court, efforts at excessive secrecy had
significantly broken down, and the Justices were well aware of the
deficiencies in the Bush Administration’s legal interpretations, the grave
need for external checks, and the broader implications of their rulings.198
Second, the Bush policies were deeply flawed in ways that are
anomalous. A narrative of policy continuity has emerged during the Obama
Administration that obscures critical differences and promotes inaccurate
understandings of the extent to which presidents make sweeping claims of
preclusive war powers. Another narrative of ever-expanding presidential
war powers in modern times similarly obscures the exceptional nature of
President Bush’s claims. President Obama, like all presidents, of course is
vulnerable to criticism for his foreign affairs policies. But the differences
between President Bush’s initial counterterrorism policies and those of
other presidents, including President Obama, are profound in respects
relevant to the rule of law and judicial review. As sections B and C below
describe, President Bush stands alone in his pattern of often secret claims of
broad constitutional authority to act in direct contradiction of statutes—or,
similarly, to “interpret” statutes in light of his expansive views of his own
constitutional powers in order to “avoid” constitutional conflict. President
Bush and his advisors undoubtedly were motivated in their actions by a
sincere desire to protect the nation’s security against terrible threats. In their
choice of methods, however, they intentionally sought to expand
presidential war powers and to diminish checks on the exercise of those
powers from Congress, the courts, and the public, all while they weakened
traditional checks internal to the Executive Branch.
A. President George W. Bush’s Administration
On June 28, 2004, the Court issued its first rulings rejecting the policy
of indefinitely detaining suspected terrorists while denying access to
lawyers and the courts.199 As the Bush Administration had informed the
198

Part III.A expands on this point, but, to take one example, within minutes of the Court’s handing
down of Hamdan, Professor Lederman wrote:
Even more importantly for present purposes, the Court held that Common Article 3 of Geneva
applies as a matter of treaty obligation to the conflict against Al Qaeda. That is the HUGE part of
today’s ruling. The commissions are the least of it. This basically resolves the debate about
interrogation techniques, because Common Article 3 provides that detained persons “shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely,” and that “[t]o this end,” certain specified acts “are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever”—including “cruel treatment and
torture,” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment.” . . .
This almost certainly means that the CIA’s interrogation regime is unlawful, and indeed, that
many techniques the Administration has been using, such as waterboarding and hypothermia (and
others) violate the War Crimes Act (because violations of Common Article 3 are deemed war
crimes).
Marty Lederman, Hamdan Summary—And HUGE News, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2006, 10:37 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/06/hamdan-summary-and-huge-news (emphases omitted).
199
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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Court in its briefs and the accompanying Jacoby Declaration, its denial of
counsel and court access in part aimed at inducing in 9/11 detainees feelings
of helplessness, dependency, and trust that the Administration believed
would improve the effectiveness of its harsh interrogation techniques.200
During the two months before the Court’s three rulings, the issue of the
United States’ possible complicity in unlawful interrogations and even
torture dominated the news. The Abu Ghraib scandal, with its horrific
photographs of U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners, broke on April 28,
2004,201 the very day of the Padilla oral argument.202 In that scandal’s wake,
someone leaked a shocking legal memorandum (“the Torture Memo”)
issued almost two years earlier in which OLC secretly advised that a federal
statute banning the use of torture could not constrain the President’s choice
of interrogation methods in combating terrorism.203 President Bush already
had announced, on February 7, 2002, his determination that Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—which prohibited not only “cruel
treatment and torture” but also “outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment”—did not apply to the
conflict with al Qaeda.204
The Torture Memo began with a flawed statutory analysis inconsistent
with the clear import of the federal anti-torture statute, followed with an
extreme theory of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief as
allowing outright noncompliance with the statute, and concluded with
200

See supra note 81.
James Risen, G.I.’s Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A15
(discussing the 60 Minutes II story that aired on CBS the previous night); see also Seymour M. Hersh,
Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42; Slide Show: The Abu Ghraib Pictures, New
Yorker (May 3, 2004) http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/03/slideshow_040503.
202
The story broke after the oral argument, during which the Justices asked what was to constrain
the government from torturing detainees for information. The Solicitor General replied that the courts
remained open as a check but urged the Justices to defer to the President: “[Y]ou have to trust the
executive to make the kind of quintessential military judgments that are involved . . . .” Transcript of
Oral Argument, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 1066129, at *19; see
also id. (“[T]hat executive discretion in a war situation can be abused is not a good and sufficient reason
for judicial micromanagement and overseeing of that authority.”). Linda Greenhouse wrote in the New
York Times that the discussion of torture in the oral argument took on a “different, even chilling, tone” in
light of the release hours later of the Abu Ghraib photographs. Linda Greenhouse, Word for
Word/Rumsfeld v. Padilla; The Supreme Court Asks: Who Will Guard the Guardians, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., May 9, 2004, at WK7.
203
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 172, 172
[hereinafter OLC Torture Memo]; see Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse
and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32; Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey
Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, A1.
204
Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Dick Cheney et al., Humane
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at
134, 134.
201

506

106:467 (2012)

“The Essence of a Free Society”

faulty applications of the defense doctrines of necessity and self-defense.
The Commander-in-Chief analysis was of broadest implication and failed
even to acknowledge Congress’s countervailing constitutional war powers
or the then-leading Supreme Court precedent of relevance, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.205 OLC’s interpretations in the Torture Memo,
once leaked to the public, provoked widespread condemnation, prompting
President Bush immediately to seek to distance himself from it and the Abu
Ghraib abuses by declaring (just days before the Court released its initial
detainee rulings) that “America stands against and will not tolerate
torture.”206
In December 2004—several months after the Court’s first 9/11
decisions and long before Hamdan—the Bush Administration released
another long-secret OLC opinion that explained its view of the Executive’s
authority to act contrary to statutes.207 That memorandum, written just two
weeks after 9/11, essentially interpreted the President’s constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief as exceedingly broad and Congress’s war
powers as exceedingly narrow: Congress may not “place any limits on the
President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military
force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the
response.”208 Thus, the scope of the AUMF did not limit President Bush’s
conduct of the “War on Terror.”209 Applying the same reasoning to criminal
penalties Congress had imposed for torture, the Torture Memo put it this
way:
Congress can no more interfere with the President’s conduct of the
interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical
decisions on the battlefield. Just as statutes that order the President to conduct
warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be unconstitutional, so
too are laws that seek to prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he
believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States.210

These radical arguments were widely known and criticized in the
spring of 2006, as the Court considered the Bush Administration’s proposed
205

343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952); see OLC Torture Memo, supra note 203, at 204–07.
Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1167, 1167 (June 26, 2004).
207
The Bush Administration kept the memo secret until the Senate pressured release in connection
with the confirmation hearing of Attorney General nominee Alberto Gonzales. Michael Isikoff, 2001
Memo Reveals Push for Broader Presidential Powers, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 17, 2004, 7:00 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2004/12/17/2001-memo-reveals-push-for-broaderpresidential-powers.html.
208
Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Timothy Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 3, 24.
209
See, e.g., id. at 22–24.
210
OLC Torture Memo, supra note 203, at 207.
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interpretation of the AUMF as support for its military commissions in briefs
submitted in Hamdan.211 In December 2005 the press uncovered another
secret counterterrorism program that did not comply with federal statutory
requirements, and which the Bush Administration justified based in part on
the same, flawed Commander-in-Chief theory: for years, the Bush
Administration had engaged in electronic surveillance in the United States
without complying with the court-order requirements set forth in the federal
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.212 The months before the Court
issued Hamdan also brought detailed press reports of secret overseas black
sites holding certain “high value” detainees;213 waterboarding and other
extreme forms of interrogations (such as dousing detainees with extremely
cold water in cells maintained at very low temperatures) used repeatedly
and over long periods;214 and U.S. involvement in extraordinary renditions
of detainees, including some later found to be innocent of any wrongdoing,
to other countries where they were tortured.215
In response, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA),
which, among other things, prohibited not only torture but also “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”216 When the Bush
Administration could not stop the law, it achieved amendments to minimize
what it viewed as the DTA’s harms.217 In signing the law, President Bush
issued a statement in which he appeared to claim the right not to comply
211

The Administration, however, did not present them directly to the Court, as Justice Stevens’s
opinion for the Court would pointedly note. Justice Stevens wrote: “Whether or not the President has
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers.
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). “The
Government does not argue otherwise.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006).
212
DOJ issued an unusual, unsigned “white paper”—rather than the more typical signed OLC
memorandum—laying out its statutory and constitutional arguments in defense of noncompliance with
the statute. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Auths. Supporting the Activities of the Nat’l
Sec. Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted in David Cole & Martin S. Lederman,
The National Security Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355,
1374 (2006); see David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20.
213
See Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Defends CIA’s Clandestine Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005,
at A15; Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 18, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Investigation/story?id=1322866.
214
Ross & Esposito, supra note 213.
215
See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary
Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106.
216
42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a) (2006).
217
The meaning of one such provision, depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction, was at issue in
Hamdan. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572–84 (2006); supra Part I.D; see also Jonathan
Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 8, 2006, at 44, 88
(describing how Senator Lindsey Graham “effectively interced[ed] on the administration’s behalf in
what amounted to an end run around the Supreme Court” by securing approval of an amendment that
stripped Guantánamo detainees of habeas rights).
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with the DTA or, alternatively, to interpret it to be consistent with his
expansive view of his constitutional authorities.218 This signing statement
provoked strong objections from members of Congress, led by the DTA’s
principal sponsor, former Vietnam prisoner of war and victim of torture
Senator John McCain, and the Washington Post editorialized about the risk
that illegal abuse would continue.219 OLC, in fact, proceeded to interpret the
DTA as not prohibiting waterboarding or other extreme forms of
interrogation, in opinions reported in the press but which the Bush
Administration refused to release.220
Through signing statements, President Bush controversially claimed
the right to refuse to enforce literally hundreds of federal statutory
provisions in addition to the DTA, or to interpret them to avoid conflicts
with his extreme view of his constitutional powers.221 Although President
Bush began releasing such statements at the outset of his presidency—and
had objected to the constitutionality of over a thousand statutory provisions
by the end of 2006222—the radical import of these abbreviated and vague
218

His signing statement announced he would construe the DTA “in a manner consistent with the
constitutional authority of the President . . . as Commander in Chief and consistent with the
constitutional limitations on the judicial power.” Statement on Signing the Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).
219
Editorial, Unchecked Abuse, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at A20 (“Without aggressive
monitoring—and possibly further action—by Congress, illegal abuse of foreign prisoners in the custody
of the United States is likely to continue.”); see also David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Bush Says He’s
Confident that He and McCain Will Reach Agreement on Interrogation Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2005, at A22.
220
Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1 (“In the end, Mr. Bradbury’s opinion delivered what the White House
wanted: a statement that the standard imposed by Mr. McCain’s Detainee Treatment Act would not
force any change in the C.I.A.’s practices, according to officials familiar with the memo.”). The memos,
made public years later by the Obama Administration, confirm the press accounts. See Memorandum
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John
A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined
Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 10, 2005);
Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (May
10, 2005); Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of United States
Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques That May Be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005). These and other opinions
released by the Obama Administration, along with memoranda explaining their release and withdrawal,
can be found at Office of Legal Counsel: Selected Opinions, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/olc/index.html (last visited May 18, 2012).
221
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Powers of His
Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1.
222
See Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 307, 308 (2008).
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references to his Commander in Chief authority remained unclear until the
secret opinions on torture and war powers became publicly available in
2004.
Thus, the Court knew at the time of its Hamdi and Rasul rulings
against unreviewable indefinite detention that the Administration opposed
habeas review because of perceived interference with its desired methods of
detainee interrogation. Similarly, the Hamdan Court was well aware that its
Common Article 3 ruling doomed not only the military commissions before
it, but also the Bush Administration’s use of waterboarding and many other
extreme interrogation methods.223 The Court knew that the Administration’s
contrary interpretation of Common Article 3 came over the objection of the
State Department,224 and that as Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales
described the protections of Geneva Conventions as “quaint” and
“obsolete.”225 (Gonzales was Attorney General at the time of Hamdan.) The
Court also knew that the Administration developed the particulars of the
military commissions—including the possibility of a detainee being
sentenced to death following a military trial that admitted evidence secured
by torture—by largely excluding or ignoring the advice of key executive
branch officials, both career experts and top political appointees like
Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice.226 The press also had reported on strong opposition within the
Executive Branch to the extreme interrogation methods.227
223

In response to the Court’s ruling in Hamdan, President Bush ordered a halt to the CIA program
of “enhanced” interrogations at secret black sites overseas and ordered that fourteen “high-value” al
Qaeda suspects be moved to Guantánamo Bay from the black sites to await legal proceedings. See
Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569 (Sept. 6, 2006); David E. Sanger,
President Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1. The CIA also
prepared a new list of approved interrogation techniques that no longer included waterboarding. Scott
Shane, White House Retreats Under Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A22. In July 2007,
President Bush issued an executive order that allowed the CIA to resume certain harsh interrogation
techniques, but not waterboarding. Mark Mazzetti, Rules Lay Out C.I.A.’s Tactics in Questioning, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2007, at A1.
224
The President rejected the Department of State’s interpretation in favor of the position
elaborated in an OLC opinion of January 22, 2002, that concluded the best interpretation of “armed
conflict not of an international character” limited its reach to civil-war conflicts. See Memorandum from
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense, Application of Treaties and
Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002) in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 81,
81.
225
Eric Lichtblau, Bush Nominee Plans to Stand Firm on War-Captive Memo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2005, at A25.
226
Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1;
see also Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions
to Try Terrorists (Nov. 6, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2001/pub-millcommfinal.pdf.
227
See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 203 (describing internal opposition and highlighting that of U.S.
Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora).
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By the time the Court issued its 2008 opinion in Boumediene v. Bush,
journalist Charlie Savage had been awarded the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for his
pre-Hamdan coverage of Bush’s signing statements.228 That same year,
Savage published a highly acclaimed and widely read account of the Bush
Administration’s efforts, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, to conduct
itself in ways aimed at expanding the constitutional powers of the
presidency.229 Vice President Cheney believed that responses to Watergate
and Vietnam had dangerously weakened the presidency and that Congress
in particular had encroached on executive power.230 Professor Jack
Goldsmith, the Assistant Attorney General heading OLC in 2003 and 2004,
published a valuable and truly remarkable insider’s account confirming that
the desire to expand presidential power greatly influenced the way in which
the Bush Administration formulated counterterrorism policy.231 He reported
feeling “astonished, and immensely worried” to learn of OLC’s then-secret
advice, which he found “deeply flawed . . . sloppily reasoned, overbroad,
and incautious.”232
Finally, also in 2007, the nation—and the Court—witnessed the
dramatic story of DOJ’s refusal to sanction continuation of the then-current
formulation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Goldsmith later
described the program to Congress as “the biggest legal mess I’ve ever
encountered,”233 complete with top White House officials attempting to
pressure a hospitalized and highly sedated Attorney General to approve the
plan and threatened mass resignations from the entire leadership of DOJ.234
Goldsmith resigned nine months after taking office (and has reported
drafting three resignation letters in that time). He concluded that, ironically,
228

See Katharine Q. Seelye & James Barron, Wall Street Journal Wins 2 Pulitzer Prizes; History of
Civil Rights Reporting Also Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at B8.
229
See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); id. at 9 (quoting Cheney’s 1996 speech, noting that “it
was important to go back and try to restore that balance” in favor of “a strong presidency” (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
230
Numerous reports have described Cheney’s aspirations and efforts to expand presidential power.
See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, After the Imperial Presidency, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2008, at 42.
231
“Cheney and the President told top aides at the outset of the first term that past presidents had
‘eroded’ presidential power, and that they wanted ‘to restore’ it so that they could ‘hand off a much
more powerful presidency to their successors.” GOLDSMITH, supra note 195, at 89. Goldsmith described
extreme pressures from the White House to tailor OLC’s legal advice to support desired terrorism
policies. Goldsmith described Counsel to the Vice President David Addington’s dramatic response to his
legal advice on a counterterrorism initiative: “If you rule that way, the blood of the hundred thousand
people who die in the next attack will be on your hands.” Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
232
Id. at 10.
233
Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (testimony of Jack Goldsmith, former Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of
Justice).
234
See id.; Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 219
(2007) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
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the Bush Administration’s desire to “‘hand off a much more powerful
presidency’ to their successors” led the Bush Administration to
“unnecessary unilateralism”235 and a “go-it-alone approach” that threatened
legitimate presidential power.236 Details of the Terrorist Surveillance
Program, and the legal advice informing it, still have not been made public.
This was the backdrop against which the Supreme Court construed the
meaning and reviewed the application of federal statutes and international
treaties to the 9/11 detainees and, more to the point, against which the Court
reviewed the Bush Administration’s determinations in the first years after
9/11 about those meanings and applications. As discussed above, legal
scholars continue to debate the intricacies of the appropriate deference
under Chevron and other theories, considering, for example, whether and
under what circumstances the AUMF and the UCMJ are the types of
statutes regarding which the Executive’s interpretations merit deference.
The Hamdan Court’s silence probably reflects that the Court did not think
in these terms. Under any theory, except perhaps one of absolute deference,
President Bush’s claim for deference in Hamdan fails.237 Recall the
delegation theory behind Chevron: the presumption that Congress would
prefer the Executive, a politically accountable branch with superior
expertise, to resolve statutory ambiguities and fill gaps. That presumption is
utterly defeated by evidence that the Executive’s legal interpretations were
not aimed at providing the best view of the law; not informed by relevant
experts; reportedly and self-evidently skewed, including to facilitate cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment and even torture; often reached initially
in secret and without accountability; and driven by an effort to expand
executive power to the exclusion of Congress, the courts, and international
treaty obligations.
B. President Bush’s Predecessors
The argument for deference might be stronger if this were business as
usual, that is if Congress regularly legislated against a backdrop of
presidents who claimed expansive constitutional war powers to act contrary
to statutory requirements and fundamental treaty obligations. In their
comprehensive review of presidential war powers throughout U.S. history,
Professors David Barron and Marty Lederman demonstrate that this is

235

GOLDSMITH, supra note 195, at 89, 140.
Id. at 205. This seems true, for example, of signing statements: President Bush’s abuse of the
practice tarnished legitimate, longstanding uses of signing statements. See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a
President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 395, 407 (2008) (arguing that “excessive and misguided reactions can threaten legitimate
interpretive practices” such as the use of signing statements).
237
See supra Part I (detailing the Bush Administration’s arguments for deference in the Court’s
9/11 detainee cases).
236
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clearly not the case.238 The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb focuses
precisely on the extent to which presidents have claimed constitutional
authority to act in defiance of a statute—in other words, examples of Justice
Robert Jackson’s famous “zone three” in Youngstown, in which presidential
power is at its “lowest ebb.”239 After an exhaustive review beginning with
the Founding Era and continuing chronologically from George Washington
to George W. Bush, Barron and Lederman conclude that President Bush’s
view of the President’s “preclusive” war powers—that is, authority to act in
contravention of congressional statute—indeed was exceptional: “There is a
radical disjuncture between the approach to constitutional war powers the
current President [Bush] has asserted and the one that prevailed at the
moment of ratification and for much of our history that followed.”240
Noting that President Bush’s defenders cite for historical support
President Abraham Lincoln’s Civil War actions (generally viewed as the
historical high-water mark of presidential assertions of preclusive war
powers), Barron and Lederman make this period “the centerpiece” of their
historical survey.241 They compellingly establish that President Lincoln
provided no precedent for President Bush. To summarize just the most
well-known, controversial incident: when President Lincoln authorized
army generals where necessary to “suspend the writ of habeas corpus for
the public safety” after the Confederacy had fired on Fort Sumter, it was
only as an emergency measure because Congress was not in session.242 Far
from claiming any preclusive power, President Lincoln used his
constitutional authority to call Congress back into session, and his message
on the day of its return expressly acknowledged that Congress had the last

238

See Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem, supra note 25; Barron &
Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25. Barron and Lederman both served in the OLC
as career attorneys during the Clinton Administration, and later in leadership positions in the OLC at the
outset of the Obama Administration, with Barron as the acting Assistant Attorney General heading the
office and Lederman as Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
239
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
240
Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 1112. Barron and
Lederman adopt the term “preclusive” from Justice Robert Jackson to describe presidential assertions of
war powers that “would supersede any effort by Congress to use its own constitutional authorities to
enact statutes that would limit the discretion the President would otherwise be constitutionally entitled to
exercise.” Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem, supra note 25, at 694 n.6.
241
Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 993. For a very different
reading of history, and favorable comparisons between President Bush and Presidents Lincoln and
Roosevelt, see JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH ix (2009) (“I trace the genealogy of today’s [Bush Administration]
controversies back to the nation’s first Chief Executive, George Washington, then describe how Thomas
Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt used the powers of their office in
times of crisis.”).
242
Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 998.
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word on the subject.243 That message to Congress also contained President
Lincoln’s famous statement, sometimes quoted out of context, suggesting
that in order to save the nation, the President might violate a single law lest
“all the laws but one . . . go unexecuted.”244 Noting that this suggestion of a
narrow claim of emergency power is not analogous to President Bush’s
claims, Professors Barron and Lederman scrutinize the historical record and
find that “no President, as far as we know, has ever actually acted on
Lincoln’s suggestion that a single law must be violated in order that all
others—that the nation—be preserved.”245
Regarding President Franklin Roosevelt, also cited by President Bush’s
supporters, Barron and Lederman demonstrate that President Roosevelt
simply never claimed preclusive constitutional war powers, even in the face
of desperate circumstances during World War II. Roosevelt openly worked
with Congress to secure necessary authority and otherwise relied on
existing statutory authorities—which his Administration sometimes
interpreted in legally questionable ways, but never to deny Congress’s
ultimate authority.246 Professor Jack Goldsmith also rejects comparisons
between Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt and President Bush. For
example, he unfavorably compares Bush’s “go-it-alone approach”247 to
Roosevelt’s approach, which was “premised on the notion that presidential
power is primarily about persuasion and consent rather than unilateral
executive action.”248
More generally, Barron and Lederman observe that, with the exception
of the far narrower “superintendence power” of the Commander in Chief to
direct military subordinates,249 presidents did not assert preclusive war
243

Barron and Lederman also review President Lincoln’s constitutional argument in support of his
authority, Congress’s ultimate suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (and almost immediate
ratification of all of his other unilateral actions), and the Supreme Court’s response. Id. at 997–1018.
244
Id. at 999.
245
Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem, supra note 25, at 747. They
also consider instances where Presidents claimed that lesser emergencies not threatening the nation’s
existence required them to act for a limited time in advance of Congress, due to urgent needs. Id. at 747–
48. However, President Bush did not make this type of claim.
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Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 1042–55.
247
GOLDSMITH, supra note 195, at 205 (“The Bush Administration’s go-it-alone approach to many
terrorism-related legal policy issues is the antithesis of Roosevelt’s approach in 1940–1941.”).
248
Id. at 212; see also id. at 215 (“Lincoln and Roosevelt understood that, as Schlesinger said, the
‘truly strong President is not the one who relies on his power to command but the one who recognizes
his responsibility, and opportunity, to enlighten and persuade.’” (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 326 (1973))).
249
Professors Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo explore “The Unitary Executive” theory in a
recent book of that name, by surveying the positions taken by all Presidents from George Washington to
George W. Bush with regard to their preclusive constitutional authority to remove and direct all
executive branch officials. Presidents clearly possess some such authority in certain circumstances, but
the precise contours have been sharply disputed throughout our nation’s history. Most relevant to this
Article, Calabresi and Yoo, who are leading proponents of a strong unitary executive authority beyond
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powers until President Harry Truman and the Korean War,250 and then only
inconsistently—until George W. Bush. The Bush Administration went far
beyond its predecessors, pushing theory to extremes and moving from mere
assertions of theoretical powers to “outright defiance” of statutes “for
prolonged periods of time and on multiple fronts.”251
C. The Obama Administration
Writing just before President Obama’s election, Professors Barron and
Lederman cautioned that, whoever was next elected, President Bush’s
unprecedented claims of preclusive authority might prove difficult to roll
back.252 This concern was well founded and widely shared: Presidents (and
their lawyers) face strong temptations and pressures—heightened in the
context of national security threats—to claim and preserve all the powers of
their predecessors. It is a testament to our constitutional system that, in
large measure, those fears have not been realized. The Obama
Administration’s approach to executive authority and the absence of
continued Supreme Court intervention suggest that the post-9/11 Court’s
unusually nondeferential stance reflected, in part, the extraordinary nature
of the Bush Administration’s claims of sweeping and preclusive executive
authority. In this regard, President Bush continues to stand as an outlier.
As President Obama’s first term neared its end, a contrary narrative
emerged that emphasized continuity across the Bush and Obama
Administrations on issues of national security and executive power, with
Congress’s ability to constrain, pointedly distinguish and sharply criticize President Bush’s assertion of
preclusive war powers, particularly for his insistence on acting in secret:
Importantly, the [Bush] administration has taken many of its most ambitious actions . . . by secret
classified executive orders. . . . Secret, classified, and broad uses of implied, inherent executive
power may be problematic because they could undermine one of the core reasons why both of us
have defended the unitary executive for our entire academic careers. One of the foundational
arguments made in support of a unitary executive from Alexander Hamilton on down to the
present is that a unitary executive promotes accountability by making it clear who is the one
person responsible for the conduct of the executive branch. Such accountability is completely lost
when the executive branch acts in secret. . . .
Support for the unitariness of the executive branch does not necessarily require supporting all
of the broad claims of inherent executive authority in the foreign policy context advanced by the
Bush administration.
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 411 (2008).
250
The Court of course rejected President Truman’s assertion of war powers in Youngstown to
support the seizure of the nation’s steel mills in furtherance of the war effort, but this did not constitute a
claim of preclusive authority. There, President Truman argued that Congress had not legislated to
preclude the seizure (in effect, it was a zone two, not a zone three, matter, as the dissenters would have
held), and he sent a message to Congress acknowledging its ultimate authority to resolve the matter. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
251
Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 1095–96. Barron &
Lederman identify only one comparably consequential instance of statutory disregard: “the actions of
President Ford in the extraordinary chaos of the last days of the Vietnam War.” Id. at 1095.
252
See id. at 1112.

515

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

headlines like It’s Obama’s White House, but It’s Still Bush’s World,253 and
George W. Obama?254 Some critics express profound disappointment with
President Obama for not delivering expected change;255 others describe
longstanding institutional pressures that they argue require structural
changes.256 Yet others, including some former Bush Administration
officials, emphasize continuity not to criticize but to praise President
Obama’s choices, which presumably serves to vindicate President Bush’s
policies.257
President Obama’s policy choices understandably have disappointed
some supporters who hoped for greater change and now observe significant
continuity with policies in place at the end of the Bush Administration.
Much of that continuity, however, resulted from the Supreme Court’s
disapproval of some of the most extreme Bush Administration policies,
which President Bush then abandoned or moderated by the time he left
office. Justice Stevens’s leadership on the Court was vital to that change, as
was pressure from within the Executive Branch and from outside the
government—from the press, the public, nongovernmental organizations,
and other nations.
With regard to the claims of preclusive executive authority of central
253

Julian E. Zelizer, It’s Obama’s White House, but It’s Still Bush’s World, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,
2010, at B1.
254
David Bromwich, George W. Obama?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 18, 2011, 10:14 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/08/18/scitech/main20094046.shtml; see also Ross Douthat, OpEd, Whose Foreign Policy Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, at A23 (speaking of the “Bush-Obama era”
and describing the structural imbalance of criticism against Bush coming from a major political party,
but criticism of Obama coming only from the far left and the libertarian right). But see Andrew Sullivan,
What Continuity?, DAILY BEAST (May 9, 2011, 12:22 PM), http://andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com/
2011/05/what-continuity.html (rebutting Douthat’s assertions).
255
See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., Taking Liberties: Obama May Prove Disastrous in Terms of
Protecting Our Rights, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at A17 (“Candidate Obama . . . portrayed himself as
the champion of civil liberties. However, President Obama not only retained the controversial Bush
policies, he expanded on them.”); Glenn Greenwald, Miranda Is Obama’s Latest Victim, SALON (Mar.
24, 2011, 9:25 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/03/24/miranda_5 (arguing that “Obama has violently
breached his own alleged principles when it comes to the War on Terror and the rule of law” on so many
instances that they “are too numerous to chronicle in one place”).
256
Professor Bruce Ackerman, for example, advocates moving many of OLC’s core responsibilities
to a “Supreme Executive Tribunal.” See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010). But see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1688 (2011) (reviewing ACKERMAN, supra, and arguing persuasively to the contrary).
257
See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11 5 (2012) (“Contrary to nearly everyone’s expectations, the Obama administration would continue
almost all of its predecessor’s policies, transforming what had seemed extraordinary under the Bush
regime into the ‘new normal’ of American counterterrorism policy.”); YOO, supra note 241, at 443
(“President Obama has come to have more in common with the ends of the Bush Administration’s
terrorism policies than did Candidate Obama.”); Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, at 52, 54 (quoting Brad Berenson, former
Assistant Counsel to President Bush, as saying that “from the perspective of a hawkish Bush nationalsecurity person the glass is eighty-five per cent full in terms of continuity”).
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concern to this Article, it is plainly wrong to equate President Obama’s
policies to the early Bush detainee policies, including those that prompted
the Supreme Court’s robust review.258 President Obama, quite simply, has
not asserted sweeping constitutional war powers to act in violation of
federal statutes. Nor has there been any hint of secret violations of statutes.
To the contrary, President Obama expressly rejected the Bush
Administration’s approach as inconsistent with our legal traditions and
values, and called instead for fighting terrorism “with an abiding confidence
in the rule of law and due process; in checks and balances and
accountability.”259
President Obama has grounded his assertions of presidential war
powers in authorities conferred by Congress, principally in the AUMF. He
ordered the closure of secret black sites overseas and barred the use of
extreme interrogation methods, directing compliance with the Geneva
Conventions (expressly including Common Article 3) and the methods
detailed in the Army Field Manual.260 He announced his intent and tried to
close the detention center at Guantánamo Bay,261 but Congress thwarted that
effort.262 He has not sent a single additional detainee there. He expressed his
preference to prosecute suspected terrorists in civilian Article III courts
when feasible, and has often done so, but Congress by legislation has
blocked that option for the Guantánamo detainees.263
Of course, strong grounds exist (beyond the scope of this Article) for
policy-based disagreements with Obama Administration counterterrorism
policies. But those policies respect legal constraints imposed by Congress
and by international law, and reflect a more traditional and moderate
approach to executive authority than that promoted by President Bush. For
example, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Hamdan, correctly
rejected as unlawful President Bush’s military commissions—and by
implication his extreme interrogations policies—established without
adequate respect for Congress, legal constraints, or expertise and good
258

David Cole has provided the best of the relatively rare refutations of the charge. See David Cole,
Breaking Away: Obama’s War on Terror Is Not “Bush Lite,” NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2010, at 17.
259
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09.
260
See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009); Memorandum from David J.
Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney Gen., Withdrawal of
Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (June 11, 2009); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney Gen., Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel
CIA Interrogation Opinions (Apr. 15, 2009).
261
See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009).
262
See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(a), 123 Stat. 1859,
1920 (barring transfers from Guantánamo to the United States).
263
Sources documenting this vociferous, multi-year debate are voluminous. See, e.g., Mayer, supra
note 257; Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at
A1; see also Obama, supra note 259 (“[W]henever feasible, we will try those who have violated
American criminal laws in federal courts—courts provided for by the United States Constitution.”).
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judgment from within his own Administration. President Obama acted
within his lawful options when he elected to work with Congress to reform
(through greater procedural, evidentiary, and appellate protections) rather
than eliminate military commissions as one available venue for trying
Guantánamo detainees. Where he has been unable to persuade Congress,
President Obama has abided by congressional restrictions on his ability to
decide how best to prosecute the war authorized by the AUMF.264
President Obama confronted severe challenges in restoring rule-of-law
values where discredited and discontinued Bush Administration policies
regarding the Guantánamo detainees had continuing effect—including the
use of torture and other extreme interrogation methods that complicate
prosecution, and the very creation of the detention facility at Guantánamo in
an effort to avoid the rule of law. Although President Obama has not added
a single detainee to the 779 the Bush Administration sent to Guantánamo265
(down to 196 when President Obama took office on January 21, 2009),266
169 Guantánamo detainees remained as of April 2012.267
In those cases in which the Obama Administration determined
continued detention was appropriate, it has been strikingly—some would
264

One particularly complex and controversial example illustrates that President Obama’s generally
commendable efforts to work with Congress and abide by statutory limits occasionally brought costs for
both executive authority and individual rights. President Obama worked with Congress to achieve
substantial improvements in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA),
Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). Despite continuing concerns with restrictions it placed on the
detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists and to considerable criticism, he
ultimately signed the NDAA into law in order to secure funding and other provisions he viewed as vital.
See Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 978 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD201100978/pdf/DCPD-201100978.pdf. President Obama pledged to implement the law so as to avoid its
potential harms; for example, he would not subject a U.S. citizen to indefinite military detention without
trial. Id. He noted the possibility, however, that he would assert preclusive constitutional authority if
circumstances developed in which the NDAA could not be applied in a constitutional manner:
My Administration will design the implementation procedures authorized by section 1022(c) to
provide the maximum measure of flexibility and clarity to our counterterrorism professionals
permissible under law. And I will exercise all of my constitutional authorities as Chief Executive
and Commander in Chief if those procedures fall short, including but not limited to seeking the
revision or repeal of provisions should they prove to be unworkable.
Id. For a thoughtful evaluation of the pros and cons of the much-misunderstood NDAA, see Marty
Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of War—Part I, OPINIO
JURIS (Dec. 31, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/31/the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-thelaws-of-war-part-i, and Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the
Laws of War—Part II, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 31, 2011, 5:20 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/31/thendaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-war-part-ii [hereinafter Lederman & Vladeck, Part II].
265
GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
266
Julie Tate & Peter Finn, The Prisoners of Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2010/01/22/GR2010012200359.html.
267
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced, No. 291-12 (Apr. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15202.
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say disappointingly—successful in withstanding legal challenge. Not a
single detainee has prevailed on appeal and secured release since the
Supreme Court ordered habeas corpus review in Boumediene in 2008
(though in many cases the government chose not to appeal, or voluntarily
released or transferred detainees).268 This success and the Supreme Court’s
decisions not to reverse any of these rulings may be attributed at least in
part to the Obama Administration’s more modest view of executive
authority and specifically the grounds on which it has evaluated and
justified continued detention.
Soon after President Obama took office, DOJ notified the courts of a
change in position in the pending Guantánamo habeas litigation: the
government would rely solely upon Congress’s enactment of the AUMF
rather than an expansive view of the President’s constitutional authority.
Also, in stark contrast to the Bush Administration, it argued that the
interpretation of the AUMF is “necessarily informed by principles of the
laws of war.”269 The Obama Administration maintained this view of the
constraining effect of international law even in the face of remarkable
opposition from a D.C. Circuit panel in Al-Bihani v. Obama, which found
“mistaken” “the premise that the war powers granted by the AUMF and
other statutes are limited by the international laws of war.”270 In the face of
the panel’s efforts—essentially to expand executive power to act contrary to
international law, even beyond that claimed by the Executive—the Obama
Administration stood firm and argued to the full D.C. Circuit that the
panel’s statement “does not properly reflect the state of the law,” including
the Court’s view of international law in Hamdi and the longstanding canon
that statutes should be construed as consistent with applicable international
law.271 In denying rehearing en banc, the D.C. Circuit effectively sided with
the Obama Administration and issued a statement, joined by seven judges,
explaining that the panel’s discussion of international law “is not necessary
to the disposition of the merits.”272 Congress later affirmed the
Administration’s view that the detention authority should be construed in

268

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see Wittes, Chesney & Reynolds, supra note 22, at

9–11.

269

Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay at 1, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, Nos.
05-0763, 05-1646, 05-2378 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009). In this memorandum, DOJ argued for far more
limited deference than it had during the Bush Administration: “[C]ourts should defer to the President’s
judgment that the AUMF, construed in light of the law-of-war principles that inform its interpretation,
entitle him to treat members of irregular forces as state military forces are treated for purposes of
detention.” Id. at 6 n.2.
270
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
271
Response to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 5, Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 866 (No.
09-5051).
272
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying rehearing en banc).
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accordance with the law of war.273 The court of appeals also accepted the
Administration’s position that the government is required to demonstrate
that detainees are part of enemy forces by a preponderance of the evidence
standard,274 even as some judges on the court have criticized the Obama
Administration for arguing for a position that might impose on itself a
higher-than-necessary burden of proof.275
Of more general application, President Obama’s OLC publicly released
a memorandum that outlines “Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and
Written Opinions” to guide the work of OLC lawyers on all matters,
domestic as well as foreign.276 The memorandum “reaffirms the
longstanding principles” that typically guide OLC (though clearly did not
for some post-9/11 advice). Most important, consistent with the President’s
constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,” OLC’s lawyers must “provide an accurate and honest appraisal
of applicable law, even if that appraisal will constrain the Administration’s
or an agency’s pursuit of desired practices or policy objectives.”277 As the
memorandum correctly notes, this obligation is especially important
because OLC “is frequently asked to opine on issues of first impression that
are unlikely to be resolved by the courts—a circumstance in which OLC’s
advice may effectively be the final word on the controlling law.”278 From all
that is publicly known, OLC has adhered to these best practices under
President Obama and has restored integrity to the critical function of
advising the President and his executive officers.
Although a comprehensive review of the Obama Administration’s
assertions of executive authority is beyond the scope of this Article, two
matters merit note for prompting serious criticism on rule-of-law grounds.
According to public reports, President Obama disagreed with and did not
follow OLC’s advice on the interpretation of the War Powers Resolution as

273

Lederman & Vladeck, Part II, supra note 264.
See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878.
275
See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1001 (2011) (“We are thus left with no adversary presentation on an important question affecting many
pending cases . . . . Although we doubt, for the reasons stated above, that the Suspension Clause requires
the use of the preponderance standard, we will not decide the question in this case.”). Judge Laurence
Silberman suggested that the D.C. Circuit actually might not apply the preponderance standard: “I doubt
any of my colleagues will vote to grant a [habeas] petition if he or she believes that it is somewhat likely
that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an active supporter.” Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075,
1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring). For a careful review of the D.C. Circuit’s detainee
rulings, see Vladeck, supra note 14.
276
Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to Attorneys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions
(July 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf (internal
quotation marks omitted).
277
Id. at 1.
278
Id.
274
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applied to U.S. military action in Libya.279 The War Powers Resolution
(among other things) requires the President to withdraw U.S. military forces
from “hostilities” sixty days after introduction if Congress has not
specifically authorized continuation of the use of force.280 OLC reportedly
advised that operations in Libya, including multiple unpiloted drone air
attacks, constituted hostilities.281 Public reports can of course be inaccurate,
but this reported interpretation seems the correct one—which means that the
continued operations in Libya violated the War Powers Resolution.282 Even
assuming, however, that continuation of the Libya operation violated the
law as best interpreted, comparisons with the Bush Administration’s flawed
legal interpretations and claims of preclusive authority were misplaced.283
The Obama Administration publicly provided a plausible (if ultimately
unconvincing) explanation of its interpretation that relied in part on past
presidential practice, including through detailed Senate testimony by State
Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh.284 Far from making any claim of
preclusive authority, President Obama made plain he was not challenging
the constitutionality of the sixty-day clock (as President Richard Nixon had
in vetoing the War Powers Resolution) or other limits Congress might
impose on the operation.285
279

See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011,
at A1. The President certainly may act against OLC’s advice (which, in fact, rarely happens), but he
should do so based on a good-faith substantive difference as to the best legal interpretation, one that is
not inappropriately driven by desired outcome. All accounts suggest OLC provided accurate advice in
the Libya matter, but the process may have been complicated by the lack of a confirmed head of OLC.
The Senate did not hold a vote on President Obama’s nominees for the first two and a half years of his
administration. In the interest of full disclosure, I was President Obama’s first nominee and withdrew
after waiting more than a year for a Senate vote.
280
See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006).
281
Savage, supra note 279; see also Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Attorney Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011),
available at www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (memorializing the legal
advice given by OLC to the Attorney General before the commencement of military operations in
Libya).
282
Dawn Johnsen, Different Kinds of Wrong: The Difference Between Obama’s Libya Policy and
Bush’s Torture Policy, SLATE (July 5, 2011, 6:17 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2298436.
283
The comparison came from both sides: those critical of the Libya operation, see Bruce
Ackerman, Op-Ed., Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A27, and those who
argued it was lawful and helped vindicate the Bush Administration’s legal interpretations on torture, see
Eric Posner, Stop Complaining About Harold Koh’s Interpretation of the War Powers Act, NEW
REPUBLIC (July 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/91166/harold-koh-war-powersjohn-yoo-libya.
284
Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 7
(2011) (testimony of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
285
See Richard Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893, 893 (Oct. 24, 1973).
In fact, Department of State legal advisor Harold Koh, in responding to written questions from Senator
Richard Lugar after the hearing on Libya, affirmed that the Obama Administration agreed instead with
the Carter Administration’s conclusion that the sixty-day clock was constitutional. Libya and War
Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 53 (2011) (responses of legal
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The second serious charge of unlawful action is aimed at the United
States’ use of unpiloted drones to target and kill certain suspected terrorist
leaders abroad, and in particular the reported September 2011 killing in
Yemen of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki.286 Preliminary to the merits, and
salient to this Article’s concerns, is whether the Obama Administration
made public adequate information about the program and its legal rationale,
sufficient for Congress, interested citizens, and other observers to provide
the kind of external check on both the wisdom and legality of executive
action that proved vital during the Bush Administration. Classified
programs and covert actions often involve difficult judgments of how best
to balance competing requirements for secrecy and democratic
accountability. Thus far, the Obama Administration has refused to release
or even acknowledge the existence of an OLC opinion that, according to the
New York Times, provided the legal basis for proceeding with the
operation.287 Instead, some months after al-Awlaki’s killing, Attorney
General Eric Holder and other Obama Administration officials gave
speeches providing considerable detail on the circumstances in which the
Administration considers such a killing lawful.288 The analysis turns on
highly fact-dependent questions of both domestic and international law,
which for a U.S. citizen include constitutional guarantees such as the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process. Here, the Administration should
release additional information on the internal executive processes and
standards and provide a redacted OLC opinion or substitute memorandum
detailing the legal analysis. The Attorney General and other officials,
however, already have provided adequate detail to establish that far from an
advisor Harold Koh to questions submitted by Sen. Richard G. Lugar).
286
Mark Mezzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car
in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1.
287
See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2011, at A1.
288
John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Remarks to
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s
Counterterrorism Strategy” (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/
brennanspeech; Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html; Jeh
Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel to the Dep’t of Def., Remarks at Yale Law School, National Security
Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-yale-law-school.
The
Obama
Administration also relies on constitutional sources of executive authority for national security activities,
as particularly noted in an April 2012 speech by another national security official. See Stephen W.
Preston, Gen. Counsel to the Cent. Intelligence Agency, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Apr. 10,
2012),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speechestestimony/cia-general-counsel-harvard.html. Still, nothing in this speech or elsewhere suggests the
Obama Administration acted based on an overly broad theory of executive authority, whether in the
absence of or in contravention of congressional action. If anything, the targeted drone killings, and even
more the Libya/sixty-day clock examples are viewed by some as controversial interpretations of
statutory provisions supportive of desired executive action.

522

106:467 (2012)

“The Essence of a Free Society”

assertion of preclusive executive power, President Obama has relied on his
interpretation of authority granted by Congress through the AUMF.289
President Obama may have contributed to exaggerated claims that he
has simply continued Bush Administration policies by emphasizing the
“need to look forward as opposed to looking backwards,”290 including when
a week before even taking office he was asked whether he might appoint a
special prosecutor to investigate possible Bush Administration violations of
law. A few months later, when President Obama announced the clearly
correct position that the government would not prosecute any government
employee who reasonably relied in good faith on DOJ legal advice, he
again elaborated more sweepingly: “[A]t a time of great challenges and
disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by spending our time and energy
laying blame for the past.”291 He similarly explained his opposition to
creating a fact-finding commission to investigate torture or other potential
wrongdoing:
I’ve opposed the creation of such a commission because I believe that our
existing democratic institutions are strong enough to deliver accountability.
The Congress can review abuses of our values, and there are ongoing inquiries
by the Congress into matters like enhanced interrogation techniques. The
Department of Justice and our courts can work through and punish any
violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice.292

President Obama was right in theory: existing institutions—DOJ and
the courts, as well as Congress—theoretically can provide for appropriate
accountability and protect against future executive abuses. Whether steps
taken toward public accountability will prove sufficient is not yet known.
Early in his Administration, President Obama took a vital step by releasing
and repudiating Bush-era OLC memos on harsh interrogation methods.293 It
289

For example, the Obama Administration views the President’s authority as not limited
geographically, except to the extent international law imposes sovereignty-based limits on the use of
force, and as authorizing the use of force against the operational leaders of al Qaeda and cobelligerent
forces in the armed conflict with the United States. For the Administration’s public explanation to date
of the extent of its authority to engage in targeted killings using drones, see sources cited supra note
288.
290
George Stephanopoulos, Obama Leaves Door Open (a Bit) on Prosecuting Bush Officials, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2009, 9:16 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/01/obama-leaves-do
(providing transcript of a This Week interview with Obama); see also Aide: Obama Won’t Prosecute
Bush Officials, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 2009, 10:36 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/20/
politics/main4955428.shtml.
291
Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement of President Barack
Obama on Release of OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/statement-president-barack-obama-release-olc-memos.
292
Obama, supra note 259.
293
See Press Release, supra note 291. His DOJ, however, also has vigorously defended against
individual lawsuits alleging harm from the Bush Administration’s unlawful actions, including with
assertions of state secrets, qualified immunity, and special factors to defeat Bivens claims—and it has
failed to offer compensation or even acknowledgment in circumstances of clear governmental
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seems that as a nation the United States has not yet reached consensus that
the Bush Administration’s abuses were fundamentally wrong and should
not be repeated.294
CONCLUSION
Viewed together and in context, the Supreme Court’s 9/11 detainee
rulings, with Justice Stevens playing the leading role, effected substantial
changes in national counterterrorism policies. Although not the direct
subject of any of its cases, ending the unlawful practices of waterboarding
and other methods of torture was surely among the most significant direct
changes wrought by the Court. More fundamentally, the Court helped
restore the rule of law and the constitutional balance of powers. The rulings
are best understood in the context of an Administration that, following
wrongdoing. See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011) (pending en
banc rehearing of the panel’s ruling in favor of a Bivens claim proceeding on allegations of torture);
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing case on basis
of government’s assertion of state secrets but encouraging voluntary action to compensate injured
individuals whose meritorious claims cannot proceed due to secrecy concerns, emphasizing the
government’s responsibility to promote justice, especially when judicial review is not possible); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing Bivens claim by a man to whom the
Canadian government awarded millions of dollars following a governmental inquiry that found he was
the victim of torture due to U.S. and Canadian action).
294
As President Obama’s first term drew to an end, some of his critics have portrayed President
Obama as dangerously weak and have continued to argue that waterboarding is not torture or unlawful
and that, in any event, it yields valuable information. Even in the immediate wake of the killing of
Osama bin Laden, some former Bush Administration officials sought to turn that Obama Administration
success into support for Bush Administration policies of waterboarding and other extreme interrogation
techniques. See, e.g., Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., The Waterboarding Trail to bin Laden, WALL ST. J.,
May 6, 2011, at A15 (criticizing Obama’s interrogation practices and arguing that the intelligence
leading to bin Laden could be traced to the Bush Administration’s repeated waterboarding of detainees).
But see John McCain, Op-Ed., The Damage Torture Does, WASH. POST, May 12, 2011, at A21
(describing former Attorney General Mukasey’s claim as “false,” and arguing that waterboarding
“produced false and misleading information” and, in any event, is wrong). Justice Stevens himself, in
remarks as part of this Northwestern University School of Law symposium, made news for his candid
praise of President Obama with regard to killing bin Laden. See Jess Bravin, Justice Stevens: Killing bin
Laden Was Lawful, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 13, 2011, 7:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/
05/13/justice-stevens-killing-bin-laden-was-lawful (quoting Justice Stevens as saying he had “not the
slightest doubt that it was entirely appropriate for U.S. forces” to target bin Laden and that he was proud
of President Obama for making the decision to execute the operation); see also 60 Minutes: Hard
Measures: Ex-CIA Head Defends Post-9/11 Tactics (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 2012), available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7406950n&tag=contentBody;storyMediaBox (noting the
comments of Jose Rodriguez, former head of CIA’s clandestine operations, who defended his
destruction of videotapes depicting waterboarding of suspected terrorists and other post-9/11 U.S.
actions, expressing “no regrets”). A pending Senate Intelligence Committee investigation into the Bush
Administration’s interrogation policies promises to help set the public record straight. See Joint
Statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman S. Intelligence Comm., and Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman,
S. Armed Servs. Comm. (Apr. 27, 2012), available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
files/serve?File_id=026a329b-d4c0-4ab3-9f7e-fad5671917cc.
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brutal attacks on America, sought unprecedented expansions of executive
power, discretion, secrecy, and deference. The Court forced the Bush
Administration to abandon its go-it-alone stance and instead to respect
traditional checks on executive power: from the Court, from Congress, from
within the Executive Branch, and—with greater transparency—from the
American people. It is important to recall that the course of litigation and
public response depended in part upon leaked documents, a contingency
upon which the rule of law and constitutional balance should not depend. In
time, the cases may well be remembered not primarily as post-9/11 cases
concerning the Executive’s authority over suspected terrorists, but as part of
a select line of landmark cases that secures the deep and lasting structure of
our constitutional commitment to democracy, separation of powers, and the
rule of law, even in the face of daunting challenges. Justice Stevens, more
than any other Justice, ensured the Court’s continued commitment to these
principles and earned posterity’s recognition for a job well done.
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